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— “Th[e] principle is itself one of commonsense; even a person with 
little legal knowledge would be loathe to think that a contract is not subject 
to existing laws unless they are expressly incorporated.”
1
 
— [The implied incorporation of laws] “can not be accepted as correct,” 
[because the implied use of statutes and rules of law] “is not a rule of 
[contract] Interpretation and the statutes and rules of law are certainly not 
incorporated into the contract.”
2
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 1.  Wickman v. Kane, 766 A.2d 241, 248 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011). 
 2.  3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 551 at 197 (rev. ed. 1960). 
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INTRODUCTION 
The great majority of state and federal courts accept the general 
common law rule that courts in construing contracts shall incorporate 
relevant, unmentioned laws as implied contract terms.
3
  A common 
formulation is “the laws which subsist at the time and place of the making of 
a contract, and where it is to be performed, enter into and form a part of it, 
as if they were expressly referred to or incorporated in its terms.”
4
  Dating 
back to the early nineteenth century,
5
 this principle of contract construction 
is a “basic legal concept of longstanding and accepted use.”
6
 
Despite the doctrine’s pervasive theoretical and practical importance as 
 
 3.  See Armstrong v. Accrediting Council for Continuing Educ. and Training, Inc., 168 
F.3d 1362, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (deeming rule a “common law” concept); 11 SAMUEL L. 
WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 30:19 (4th ed. 
1999) (collecting authorities).  
 4.  Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. 535, 550 (1866) (stating also that “[t]his 
principle embraces alike those [laws] which affect its validity, construction, discharge, and 
enforcement.”).  Von Hoffman is still a leading decision.  See, e.g., Acosta v. Tyson Foods, 
800 F.3d 468, 474 (8th Cir. 2016) (noting the standard that current laws of the time and place 
where a contract is made are incorporated into the contract).  Other statements of the principle 
use different terminology but rest upon the same substantive grounds; Pan Am. Comput. Corp. 
v. Data Gen. Corp., 562 F. Supp. 693, 696 (D.P.R. 1983) (“State laws in existence at the time 
a contractual obligation is entered into become an integral part of the contract to the same 
extent as if literally incorporated therein.”). 
 5.  See Camfranque v. Burnell, 4 F. Cas. 1130, 1131 (D. Pa. 1806) (stating that laws are 
“essentially incorporated with the contract”). 
 6.  Doe v. Ronan, 937 N.E.2d 556, 562 n.5 (Ohio 2010).  The United States Supreme 
Court, twelve federal circuits and forty-one states accept the doctrine.  See 11 SAMUEL L. 
WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 30:19 (4th ed. 
1999) (collecting cases). 
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a “silent factor in every contract,”
7
 courts have failed to articulate a 
consistent, convincing policy and doctrinal rationale.  Most courts also have 
overlooked numerous doctrinal deficiencies, gaps, and contradictions and, 
further, have not acknowledged the decisions restricting or even rejecting the 
precept.  Similarly, no commentator has provided an in-depth treatment even 
though a Westlaw search reveals nearly 1,200 decisions on this topic.
8
 
This Article is the first effort in the literature to undertake a 
comprehensive descriptive and normative analysis of what will be called the 
“implied incorporation doctrine.”  Replete with presumptions and legal 
fictions, the principle is an uneasy merger of the rules of statutory and 
contract construction.  This problematic melding of statutory and contractual 
principles is the main reason for the divergent approaches and doctrinal 
contradictions.  After canvassing the key issues surrounding the principle, I 
will propose a uniform formulation that better maintains the legal and logical 
differences between laws and contract. 
The Article proceeds as follows: Part II poses some possible 
justifications for the implied incorporation doctrine and discusses some basic 
doctrinal concepts.  After exploring the connection between the implied 
 
 7.  Silverstein v. Keane, 115 A.2d 1, 7 (N.J. 1955).   
 8.  WESTLAW, Topic 95, Key Number 167: Existing law as part of contract, WESTLAW 
https://1.next.westlaw.com/Search/Results.html?jurisdiction=ALLCASES&saveJuris=False
&contentType=CUSTOMDIGEST&querySubmissionGuid=i0ad740360000015e39cfff8784
f07f00&startIndex=1&tocGuid=I3aef6a39501500a98907e5ad42f43a75&categoryPageUrl=
Home%2FWestKeyNumberSystem&searchId=i0ad740360000015e39cfff8784f07f00&kmS
earchIdRequested=False&simpleSearch=False&isAdvancedSearchTemplatePage=False&sk
ipSpellCheck=False&isTrDiscoverSearch=False&ancillaryChargesAccepted=False&provie
wEligible=False&transitionType=CustomDigestItem&contextData=(sc.Default) 
[https://perma.cc/5EQ3-V8UB] (database last searched Aug. 31, 2017).  The only article 
addressing the canon in any depth, Dolly Wu, Timing the Choice of Law by Contract, 9 NW. 
J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 401 (2012), focuses on just one aspect of the doctrine, i.e., the 
force and effect of statutes enacted after the parties have signed the contract.  All other 
articles found simply cite the precept in passing.  See, e.g., Nelson Ferebee Taylor, 
Evolution of Corporate Combination Law: Policy Issues and Constitutional Questions, 76 
N.C. L. REV. 687, 984 n.1099 (1998) (discussing the doctrine in one paragraph in a 
footnote); Kevin A. Kordana, Tax Increases in Municipal Bankruptcies, 83 VA. L. REV. 
1035, 1047 n. 61 (1997) (containing only a three sentence statement about the doctrine).  In 
the treatises, the Perillo text (JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 3.14, at 145-47 (7th ed. 
2014)) devotes a few sentences to this topic, the Farnsworth treatise has a paragraph (2 E. 
ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 7.16 at 351-52 (3d ed. 2004)), the 
current and earlier editions of the Corbin treatise each have a single section (5 MARGARET 
N. KNIFFIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.26 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 1998)); 3 
ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 551 (rev. ed. 1960)); the Bruner and 
O’Connor treatise has a single section (1A PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O’CONNOR JR.,  
CONSTRUCTION LAW § 3:65 (2016), the Murray treatise has no coverage (JOHN EDWARD 
MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS (4th ed. 2001)), and the current Williston treatise has 
some sections (11 SAMUEL L. WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS §§ 30:19 to 30:24 (4th ed. 1999)). 
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incorporation precept and the nature of contract, and considering the 
enduring problem of incomplete contracts, this Part concludes that the 
doctrine is best suited under Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code 
(U.C.C.) in contracts for the sale of goods.  Otherwise, the precept is very 
much flawed on doctrinal and normative grounds. 
In assessing the policies often stated as supporting the doctrine, Part III 
rejects the courts’ undue reliance on the legal fictions that every person 
knows the law and parties naturally intend to include applicable law as 
implied contract terms.  The Article criticizes courts’ heavy reliance on the 
parties’ uncommunicated intent as a basis for relief.  This part shows how 
these presumptions are actually mandatory rules of law that rest upon 
dubious public policy reasoning and shaky hypothetical bargains.  This part 
further analyzes where the doctrine runs counter to the generally disfavored 
nature of implied contract terms and it questions whether the doctrine is even 
a true implied term.  This part also explores the relationship between the 
doctrine and contract as a form of private ordering.  Next, this part addresses 
whether the doctrine can be explained by the common law view that private 
parties may not abrogate existing laws by way of contract. 
Part IV compares the implied incorporation doctrine to other principles 
of statutory and contractual construction.  First, it describes the differing 
roles and functions of statutes and contracts.  Second, it shows how the 
doctrine contradicts the principles for when a law may be deemed to support 
a private right of action.  To implement a rational policy against the excessive 
implied incorporation of laws, courts should not routinely construe relevant 
or applicable laws to provide a free standing contractual right of action or 
defense.  Third, this part shows how courts inappropriately pile one fiction 
upon another when they reason that a party knows and intends the law to be 
an implied part of the contract. 
After it explores whether parties may properly opt out of the implied 
incorporation doctrine, Part IV explains why the doctrine is actually an 
immutable (mandatory) rule under current law and not an interpretive default 
rule (gap filler) as a number of courts and commentators have concluded.  
The reason is that default principles pertain to contract interpretation and the 
implied incorporation doctrine pertains to the different concept of contract 
construction.  The difference is contract “construction” addresses the 
unexpressed implications of the contract by operation of law whereas 
“interpretation” assesses the meaning of the words in the contract.
9
  The 
contract interpretation versus contract construction divide is crucial for a 
proper understanding of this doctrine and the Article addresses this 
distinction at length.  Lastly, Part IV covers the ramifications of parallel 
 
 9.  See infra Part IV.F. 
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contractual and statutory enforcement of applicable laws as well as other 
canons of contractual construction. 
Part V documents a number of cases that push back on the implied 
incorporation doctrine or reject the precept (even as other cases from these 
same jurisdictions endorse it).  The most problematic jurisdiction is the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which has three or four case law 
versions of the doctrine ranging from full acceptance to almost full rejection. 
The last part of the Article (Part VI) offers a major overhaul of the 
current implied incorporation doctrine.  The Article proposes that as a 
normative matter, courts and lawmakers should simply support the limited 
policy basis underlying the rule.  Unless the parties have sufficiently 
included the law as an express contract term, the true principle should be that 
implied incorporation of a law is proper only as dictated by the law maker’s 
intent for the enactment.  As under the better view, this view of the precept 
is a matter of contract construction and not contract interpretation. 
Reconciling the disparate strands of the implied incorporation doctrine, 
a fuller description of my proposed reform is that a law can form the basis 
for an implied contract right or a contract defense only where: (1) the law in 
question is for either the joint benefit of the parties or exists for the sole 
benefit of the moving party, and (2) the contract expressly incorporates the 
particular laws (or parts of laws) as term(s) of the agreement, or (3) the law 
maker’s intent for the law (inclusive of laws stemming from the state’s police 
power) requires that a contract contain the law as conveying both a 
contractual right and remedy.  A party may waive the protection of a law 
unless the lawmaker has precluded waiver of such a right. 
 This scaled-back version of the common law doctrine is a consistent, 
fully-supported solution commensurate with the true scope and effect of the 
implied incorporation doctrine.  It also comports with the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s and many state high courts’ increasingly narrow approach toward 
distilling private rights from public laws.  Therefore, this Article should 
attract the interest of courts and legislatures willing to reconsider the 
doctrine. 
I. THE IMPLIED INCORPORATION DOCTRINE: BASIC 
ELEMENTS AND POSSIBLE JUSTIFICATIONS 
Before delving into a full-fledged critique of current doctrine, Part II of 
this Article addresses the basic concepts of the current doctrine along with 
some possible theoretical defenses for this precept. 
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A. Basic Concepts 
The Article will address some concrete examples from the case law 
showing the actual process of incorporation of rights and remedies, the effect 
of after-enacted laws, and the definitions of key terms such as “relevant” or 
“applicable” laws.
10
 
1. Examples from the Case Law 
The implied incorporation doctrine pervades the contracting process.  It 
covers all types of contracts, be they express or implied, between private 
individuals or between an individual and a federal or state government 
agency.
11
  Another important aspect of the doctrine is that an aggrieved party 
can use the doctrine as either a sword or a shield.  Some examples follow 
below. 
In Path to Health, LLP v. Long,
12
 a purchaser sued a real estate broker 
and his agency, asserting negligence, contract, and fraud claims because the 
broker allegedly misrepresented the property was zoned for commercial use.  
Idaho Code section 54–2087 specifies the duties that a brokerage owes its 
client after a buyer “enters into a written contract for representation in a 
regulated real estate transaction. . . .”  Among other statutory requirements, 
the brokerage owes duties to: “exercise reasonable skill and care;” 
“[disclose] to the client all adverse material facts actually known or which 
reasonably should have been known;” and, “when appropriate, advis[e] the 
client to obtain professional inspections of the property or to seek appropriate 
tax, legal and other professional advice or counsel.”  Although the parties’ 
Buyer Representation Agreement did not specifically reference Idaho Code 
section 54-2087, the Idaho Supreme Court deemed the statute included in the 
agreement by operation of law:  “Existing law becomes part of a contract, 
just as though the contract contains an express provision to that effect, unless 
a contrary intent is disclosed.”
13
  The Idaho Supreme Court ruled sufficient 
evidence existed that the defendant breached a duty imposed by Idaho Code 
section 54–2087 to survive defendant’s motion for summary judgment 
 
 10.  See infra Part III.  The implied doctrine does not apply when the contract expressly 
includes the law(s) in question because in that situation implication is not necessary.  See, 
e.g., Pete Lien & Sons, Inc. v. Ellsworth Peck Const. Co., 896 P.2d 761, 763 (Wyo. 1995) 
(declining to presumptively incorporate Wyoming law into a bond because the bond expressly 
incorporated it). 
 11.  Stoller v. State, 105 N.W.2d 852, 858 (Neb. 1960); Cobbs v. Home Ins. Co., 91 So. 
627, 629 (Ala. Ct. App. 1920) (stating principle). 
 12.  383 P.3d 1220 (Idaho 2016). 
 13.  Path to Health, 383 P.3d at 1227. 
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against plaintiff’s claims for relief.
14
 
In Fisher v. State,
15
 the defendant pled guilty to a class B felony where 
he was found driving a vehicle that contained a methamphetamine lab.  A 
State Police Clandestine Lab Team had to clean up the lab and incurred costs 
for that effort.  The issue on appeal was whether a plea agreement called for 
defendant’s restitution for these costs.  The Indiana Court of Appeals 
acknowledged a conflict between the case law, which provides that 
restitution may not be ordered unless it is included in the plea agreement, 
and an Indiana statute, Ind. Code section 35–48–4–17, which requires the 
trial court to order restitution in methamphetamine cleanup cases.  The 
statute did not, however, specifically require that all plea agreements include 
a provision for restitution.  Notwithstanding these issues, the court of appeals 
said that, unless expressly excluded by the agreement, a contract (which 
includes plea agreements) must be construed as having been made in 
contemplation of applicable law.
16
  Accordingly, the court of appeals held 
that the State could use the statute for the claim that the plea agreement 
implicitly incorporated the statutory restitution requirement.
17
 
2. The Effect of After-Enacted Laws 
Generally, courts have said that statutes enacted or modified after 
contract formation have “no bearing” on the parties’ rights because parties 
are not required to foresee changes in legislation.
18
  Therefore, in the most 
important variation on the rule, statutes enacted after the execution of the 
contract are not generally part of the agreement “[u]nless [the contract’s] 
provisions clearly establish that the parties intended to incorporate 
subsequent [legislative] enactments into their agreement.”
19
  This component 
of the doctrine is an “opt-in” provision as compared with the “opt-out” rule 
 
 14.  Id. at 1229. 
 15.  52 N.E.3d 871 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). 
 16.  Fisher, 52 N.E.3d at 873. 
 17.  Id.  
 18.  17A C.J.S. Contracts § 440 (2010) (collecting cases).  See also Rehbein v. 
CitiMortgage, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 2d 753, 764 (E.D. Va. 2013) (finding that the basic tenet of 
contract law is that courts impose only those laws existing at contract formation). 
 19.  Feakes v. Bozyczko, 369 N.E.2d 978, 980 (Mass. 1977).  See also In re Estate of 
Peterson, 381 N.W.2d 109, 116 (Neb. 1986) (“‘Nothing prevents the parties to a contract from 
agreeing to be bound with references to future laws . . . .’”) (quoting Bd. of Trs. v. Krizek, 
113 Ill.App.3d 222, 226 (1983)).  Another variation is the contracting parties are bound to an 
after-enacted statute if it has retroactive effect.  See Rockwell v. Rockwell, 335 S.E.2d 200, 
202 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (noting this outcome with a repealing statute).  Parallel rules exist 
for regulations.  Cf. Gen. Elec. Co. v. United States, 610 F.2d 730, 734 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (stating 
rules of interpretation applicable to statutes are “appropriate tools of analysis” for 
regulations).  
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that absent the parties’ agreement to the contrary, contracts are governed by 
applicable law.
20
 
The underlying policy for the after-enacted statute component of the 
implied incorporation doctrine is that unless they elect otherwise, “[p]eople 
rely upon the stability of the law when ordering their affairs.”
21
  “Elementary 
considerations of fairness further dictate that individuals should have an 
opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct 
accordingly; settled expectations should not be lightly disrupted.”
22
  In this 
respect, if the contract makes the parties automatically bound by after-
enacted laws but with no time limit for doing so, the promisor could incur 
extensive and unforeseeable liabilities because “[i]t would be difficult to say 
at what point [the new laws] must stop [being part of the contract].”
23
  An 
important qualification to all the above is that the state’s police power is an 
inherent element of every contract, which means to this extent, the laws 
effectuating the state’s authority in this area are not governed by the after-
enacted limiting principle.
24
 
3. Definitions of Key Terms 
The implied incorporation doctrine has some key terms, some more 
well-defined than others.  Applicable “laws” in this sense are valid, settled 
and relevant common law doctrines, federal and state constitutional 
provisions, treaties and international agreements, federal and state statutes, 
interstate compacts, and federal, state, and local regulations, ordinances, and 
codes having the force of law.
25
  The notion of a “settled law” is a legal 
principle no longer open to reasonable dispute.
26
  Other basic concepts in the 
 
 20.  See infra Part IV.D. 
 21.  Hill v. Mayall, 886 P.2d 1188, 1191 (Wyo. 1994). 
 22.  Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 315-16 (2001) 
(quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265-66 (1994)). 
 23.  Collins v. Collins Adm’r, 79 Ky. 88, 94 (Ky. 1880). 
 24.  See infra notes 146-50 and accompanying text. 
 25.  See 11 SAMUEL L.  WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS § 30:19 (4th ed. 1999) (showing the extensive nature of the subcategories of 
“laws.”). See also Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 490 (1880) (stating that the 
constitution, laws and treaties of the United States are part of state law); Gordon v. State, 608 
So. 2d 800, 802 (Fla. 1992) (noting that “valid laws” become part of the contract); Koval v. 
Peoples, 431 A.2d 1284, 1285 (Del. Super. Ct. 1984) (stating that “This principle applies 
equally to municipal ordinances.”); Green v. Lehman, 544 F. Supp. 260, 263 (D. Md. 1982) 
(applying the concept to valid regulations); Bd. of Pub. Instruction of Dade Cty. v. Town of 
Bay Harbor Islands, 81 So. 2d 637, 643 (Fla. 1955) (stating that “The Constitution and laws 
of this State are a part of every contract.”).  Whenever this Article uses the term “laws” it 
refers to the above class of enactments except where the context requires otherwise.   
 26.  See In re Doctors Hosp. of Hyde Park, Inc., 337 F.3d 951 (7th Cir. 2003) (by 
implication). But see Sadler v. Bd. of Educ. of Cabool Sch. Dist. R-4, 851 S.W.2d 707, 713 
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doctrine are less clear as discussed below. 
First, significant uncertainty surrounds the key elements of “relevancy” 
or “applicability” in the sense that the implied incorporation doctrine 
includes all relevant or applicable laws.
27
  The meaning of “relevancy,” 
“applicability,” and like concepts has numerous variations and shadings in 
the cases (and sometimes even within the same decision).
28
  Nevertheless, it 
will not suffice that the law has a vague connection to the obligations under 
the contract.
29
  Similarly, “[t]he question is not whether the legislative action 
affects the contract incidentally, or directly or indirectly . . . .”
30
  As will be 
seen below, the challenge is whether the statute addresses a legitimate 
objective of the contract and if the legislation is a reasonable and appropriate 
means for conferring a private contractual right and remedy. 
The most stringent definition of a relevant law is one that is “‘so central 
to the bargained-for exchange between the parties, or to the enforceability of 
the contract as a whole, that it must be deemed to be a term of the contract.’”
31
  
More commonly, the courts use one or two word adjectives that are vague 
and subjective.  Some decisions simply say “[a] contract incorporates the 
‘relevant law’ whether or not it is referred to in the agreement”; these 
decisions merely repeat the term “relevant” and provide no criteria for the 
determination.
32
  Other cases use the similarly unhelpful descriptions: (1) 
“[a]ll the laws of the State that ‘may relate’ to the subject matter of the 
 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (imposing the more stringent requirement of the laws being not just 
“settled” but being “well-settled”). 
 27.  For a number of cases giving little attention to this issue, See, e.g., Fisher v. State, 
52 N.E.3d 871, 873 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (stating that “[A] contract must be construed as 
having been made in contemplation of applicable law.”); Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc. v. 
Archer Daniels Midland Co., 570 F. Supp. 1529, 1542 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (stating that “It is 
presumed that the  parties had [the relevant] law in contemplation when the contract was 
made, and the contract must be construed in that light.”) (citing cases) (brackets in original).  
The dictionary definition of “applicable” is “directly relevant.”  Applicable, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  Therefore, little, if any, difference should exist between laws 
that are “relevant” and those that are “applicable.”  Generally, however, courts require a 
higher standard for relevancy to the implication of criminal statutes.  See also United States 
v. One 1962 Ford Thunderbird, 232 F. Supp. 1019, 1022 (N.D. Ill. 1964).  
 28.  Wood v. Lovett, 313 U.S. 362, 382 (1941) (Black. J., dissenting) (analyzing Home 
Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934)).   
 29.  See Hicks Rd. Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10795 at *10 (N.D. 
Ill. July 28, 1995) (stating that a statute does not create an implied contractual term unless the 
plaintiff can demonstrate an “adequate connection” between the contract and the law).  
 30.  See, e.g., Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 438 (1934) 
(examining whether state action that impairs a private contract is valid). 
 31.  AMFAC Resorts, LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 142 F. Supp. 2d 54, 73-74 (D.D.C. 
2001) (quoting Gen. Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 188-91 (1992)). 
 32.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Udall v. Colonial Penn Ins. Co., 812 P.2d 777, 784 (N.M. 
1991) (citing Montoya v. Postal Credit Union, 630 F.2d 745 (10th Cir. 1980)). 
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contract,”
33
 (2) the statutes “touching upon the subject matter” of the 
contract,
34
 and (3) every law “affecting” the contract is read into the 
contract.
35
 
The notion of relatedness is an unsatisfactory premise for implying 
absent laws as contract terms.  The decisions focusing on the degree these 
laws relate to the contract have overlooked the analogous issue in 
constitutional contract clause cases for when laws “relate” to a contract.  The 
Michigan Supreme Court has observed, “‘[f]or so nearly universal are 
contractual relationships that it is difficult if not impossible to conceive of 
laws which do not have either direct or indirect bearing upon contractual 
obligations.’”
36
  Accordingly, when courts consider issues of relatedness 
they should not get too deep into such abstract comparisons. 
Some cases do not even mention a relevancy or applicability 
component.  For example, the Florida Supreme Court briefly commented, 
“[t]he law is a part of every contract made in this State.”
37
  Similarly, the 
Supreme Court of Virginia merely stated, “[s]tatutory or ordinance 
provisions in effect at the time a contract is executed become as much a part 
of the contract as if incorporated therein.”
38
  Literally construed, the Florida 
and Virginia cases stand for the proposition that the entire state code is part 
of every contract.  This statement cannot be the law and it is doubtful that 
these courts intended a literal understanding.  These all-encompassing 
decisions ducking the relevancy concept are also inconsistent with the vast 
majority of decisions that at least attempt to narrow to some manageable 
level the laws that can impact a contract. 
The major challenge in identifying “relevant” laws is the sheer volume 
of potential choices that can await the parties or a reviewing court, which is 
essentially the same problem that exists for deciding the class of “applicable” 
laws.  The U.S. Court of Federal Claims has said: 
[P]laintiffs contend that regulations not referenced in the contract 
may be “applicable regulations.”  This proposed interpretation, 
 
 33.  Ayres v. Crowley, 30 S.E.2d 785, 788 (S.C. 1944).   
 34.  Ohmes v. Ohmes, 200 So. 2d 849, 853 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967). 
 35.  E.g., State v. Hurley, 270 N.W.2d 915, 917 (Neb. 1978) (finding the rule applicable 
to appearance bonds); Barber Pure Milk Co. of Montgomery v. Alabama State Milk Control 
Bd., 156 So. 2d 351, 355 (Ala. 1963) (requiring the law to be considered a part of a contract 
once formed). 
 36.  Lahti v. Fosterling, 99 N.W.2d 490, 497 (Mich. 1959) (quoting Wood v. Lovett, 313 
U.S. 362, 382 (1941) (Black, J., dissenting) (arising in the context of implied incorporation). 
See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall  . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the 
Obligation of Contracts.”). 
 37.  Schekter v. Michael, 184 So. 2d 641, 641 (Fla. 1966). 
 38.  Marriott v. Harris, 368 S.E.2d 225, 233 (Va. 1988) (citing Maxey v. Am. Cas. Co., 
23 S.E.2d 221, 223 (1942)).  
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however, would seem necessarily to produce considerable 
indefiniteness as to the parties’ respective obligations under the 
contract.  There are literally thousands of HUD [Housing and 
Urban Development] regulations not mentioned in the 
contract. . . . This type of inquiry could raise a Pandora’s box of 
potential problems and disagreements.
39
 
Suffice it to say, most contracts provide little in the way of standards or 
criteria by which a party could determine ex ante what “relevant” or 
“applicable” laws a court might apply ex post.  Unfortunately, most courts 
do not even mention the challenge of ex ante classification and use the terms 
“relevant” or “applicable” laws and regulations as though the class of these 
directives were self-evident.
40
 
Unraveling the definitional issue of “relevant” or “applicable” laws is 
one of the most confusing areas of the implied incorporation doctrine.  To 
the extent that a definition is possible, the most serviceable test comes from 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s hotly-contested five-four decision in Home 
Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell,
41
 which addressed both the implied 
incorporation doctrine and the cognate issue of the reach of the U.S. 
Constitution’s Contract clause.  Here, the Court in a few sentences avoided 
the trap of calculating the relatedness of the contract and a statute.
42
  Instead, 
the Court employed the more useful standard of whether the law addressed 
a legitimate objective of the contract and if the legislation was a “reasonable 
and appropriate” means to that end.
43
  By focusing on means and ends, and 
eschewing abstract questions of relatedness, the Court implemented the true 
point of the implied incorporation doctrine, which is to determine whether a 
congressional enactment is a proper means for conferring a contractual right 
and remedy upon a particular class of claimants. 
 
 39.  Nat’l Leased Hous. Ass’n v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 762, 766 (1999) (adding that 
it would have been valid for the contract to have specified a methodology for determining 
applicability).  Compare Union Pac. Res. Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 882 P.2d 212, 222 (Wyo. 1994) 
(deeming sufficient for purposes of the implied incorporation doctrine a provision that stated, 
“[t]his agreement shall be subject to all valid and applicable State and Federal laws, rules, 
regulations and orders, and the operations conducted hereunder shall be performed in 
accordance with said laws, rules, regulations and orders.”), with Dillard & Sons Const., Inc. 
v. Burnup & Sims Comtec, Inc., 51 F.3d 910, 913 (10th Cir. 1995) (approving language that 
a clause “[r]equired compliance with ‘all applicable federal, state, and local safety and 
electrical codes, and all applicable safety regulations.’”). 
 40.  See supra notes 25-39 and accompanying text (collecting cases).  A line of 
precedents in the Federal Circuit mention this same concern regarding over-incorporation.  
See infra Part V. 
 41.  290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
 42.  Id. at 438.  (“The question is not whether the legislative action affects contracts 
incidentally, or directly or indirectly, but whether the legislation is addressed to a legitimate 
end and the measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that end.”) 
 43.  Id.  
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The question arises whether this ubiquitous implied incorporation 
doctrine has a sound justification.  Putting aside for the moment the 
explanations commonly associated with the doctrine, addressed in Part III 
below, an argument does support the implied incorporation doctrine in its 
current form. 
B. The Doctrine and the Nature of Contract 
The first possible justification for the implied incorporation doctrine as 
part of the common law tradition is that it fits well with the inherent nature 
of contract.  A “contract” is a legal relationship that can be enforced where 
certain functional prerequisites are found, such as intent, offer, acceptance 
and consideration.
44
  The inherent nature of contract requires a fair and 
efficient process to measure contract formation, performance, and discharge.  
Contracts also depend on a “[r]egime of common and statutory law for [their] 
effectiveness and enforcement.”
45
  Courts characteristically apply these other 
traditional rules as a matter of law and no controversy exists that contracts 
are construed and enforced according to this legal backdrop. 
Courts also have said, “[t]he obligation of a contract consists in its 
binding force . . . .  This depends on the laws in existence when it is 
made. . . .”
46
  This judicial statement about contracts being dependent on 
laws “in existence” at the time of contracting explicitly connects the nature 
of contract and the implied incorporation precept.  In BJM, Inc. v. Melport 
Corp.,
47
 a Kentucky federal district court explained how the implied 
incorporation doctrine fits within this common law tradition: 
[I]t is axiomatic that contract enforcement must occur against a 
backdrop of applicable constitutional, statutory, and common law 
principles.  State law may define the remedies available for breach.  
It may require that contracts contain specified provisions.  Such 
provisions necessarily form a part of each covered contract 
whether or not the parties have expressly acknowledged them in 
writing.  The parties may themselves define contractual terms and 
obligations with reference to specific statutory provisions or 
definitions.  These diverse situations all have been cited in support 
of the legal proposition that contracts incorporate existing law. 
 
 44.  Home Fed. Bank of Tenn. v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 54, 61 (2004) (quoting Cal. 
Fed. Bank, F.S.B. v. United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 753, 773 (1997)), aff’d, 245 F.3d 1342 (Fed. 
Cir. 2001).  
 45.  Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Train Dispatchers, 499 U.S. 117, 129-30 (1991). 
 46.  E.g., Romein, 503 U.S. at 189 (requiring the law be applicable to the contract to be 
implied into it); see also Am. Exp. Travel Related Servs. Co. v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 755 F. 
Supp. 2d 556, 585 (D.N.J. 2010) (finding the state laws to be unrelated to the contract).   
 47.  18 F. Supp. 2d 704, 705 n.2 (W.D. Ky. 1998). 
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As indicated by BJM, it is inconsistent for courts to rely upon the legal 
backdrop of common law principles regarding contractor formation and 
performance but to object that a long-standing common law rule within this 
tradition, the implied incorporation of existing laws, is illegitimate.  Indeed, 
the U.S. Supreme Court has commented that a contract by nature is “a law 
between the parties.”
48
  Notwithstanding the surface appeal of this 
contention, the remaining parts of this Article will explain why the current 
common law doctrine as an all-encompassing rule is wanting. 
C. The Doctrine and the U.C.C. 
The implied incorporation doctrine is more defensible in contracts 
subject to the Uniform Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”), which governs 
transactions for the sale of goods.  Indeed, the U.C.C.’s sales Article (Article 
Two) is a statutory scheme requiring the inclusion of contract terms covering 
the gamut of formation and performance.
49
 
The U.C.C. directly integrates the implied incorporation doctrine.  As 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit commented in a 2003 
decision, “‘[S]tatutes are a source of implied contractual terms—the Uniform 
Commercial Code being the most common source . . . .’”
50
  A second, more 
complex reason explains the validity of the implied incorporation doctrine 
under the U.C.C.  By necessary inference, the U.C.C. adopts the implied 
incorporation doctrine.  A “contract” under U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(12) is defined 
as “the total legal obligation that results from the parties’ agreement as 
determined by [the Uniform Commercial Code] as supplemented by any 
other applicable laws.”  The term “agreement” under UCC 1-201(b)(3) is 
defined as “the bargain of the parties in fact, as found in their language or 
inferred from other circumstances . . . .”  Because the “contract” under the 
U.C.C. includes both the written instrument and “applicable laws,” as well 
as terms found as inferred from the circumstances, the doctrine is a necessary 
part of any U.C.C.-covered contract.
51
  Indeed, a federal district court 
decision construing the U.C.C. explicitly adopted the general implied 
 
 48.  United States v. Robeson, 34 U.S. 319, 327 (1835). See also United States v. Lennox 
Metal Mfg. Co., 225 F.2d 302,313 n.32 (2d Cir. 1955) (Frank, J.) (stating that “A contract has 
often been regarded as a private statute, made by the parties, governing their relations.”). 
 49.  See U.C.C. § 2-102 (“Unless the context otherwise requires, this Article applies to 
transactions in goods; . . . .”).   
 50.  See In re Doctors Hosp. of Hyde Park, Inc., 337 F.3d at 955 (concluding that it is 
reasonably clear that the Illinois legislature did mean for the Comptroller Act to trump the 
U.C.C. in a case like this). 
 51.  See U.C.C. § 1-102(3); DAVID FRISCH, LAWRENCE’S ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-103:209 (2009) (noting the continuing role of the common law except 
as displaced by the U.C.C. itself). 
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incorporation doctrine.
52
  No decision or commentary was found to the 
contrary regarding the comparison between U.C.C. and non-U.C.C. 
contracts. 
D.   The Problem of Incomplete Contracts 
A related defense for the implied incorporation principle is that it 
enables courts to deal with the enduring problem of contractual 
incompleteness.  Although courts and commentators recognize that “[a]s a 
practical matter . . . contracting parties are not always precise and frequently 
leave material provisions out of their contracts,”
53
 no requirement exists that 
contracts address every conceivable contractual right and liability.
54
  Instead, 
the contract will be sufficiently definite and complete if the court is able 
under common law concepts, including the rules of construction, to 
determine the terms upon which the parties intended to bind themselves.
55
  
The policy against pursuit of this unduly burdensome objective is that 
negotiations would be endless and contracts would be excessively 
comprehensive with no corresponding benefits.
56
 
The argument has been made that the doctrine is a gap-filler for contract 
omissions in the sense of being a default principle.  The law recognizes “a 
good many gap-fillers and presumptions” because of the difficulty of 
ascertaining the parties’ “subjective intention[s].”
57
  In explaining the use of 
gap-filling principles to remedy incomplete contracts, the Alaska Supreme 
Court has observed, 
Because contracting parties cannot plan for all contingencies that 
might arise, a court may fill gaps in contracts to ensure fairness 
where the reasonable expectations of the parties are clear. . . .  
 
 52.  See Fisherman Surgical Instruments, LLC v. Tri-anim Health Servs., Inc., 502 F. 
Supp. 2d 1170, 1179-80 (D. Kan. 2007) (applying common law version of the implied 
incorporation doctrine to a U.C.C.-covered contract). 
 53.  Dick Broad. Co. of Tenn. v. Oak Ridge FM, Inc., 395 S.W.3d 653, 668 (Tenn. 2013) 
(quoting McClain v. Kimbrough Constr. Co., 806 S.W.2d 194, 198 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990)); 
Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1581 
(2005) (providing extensive discussion). 
 54.  See Karetsos v. Cheung, 670 F. Supp. 111, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (“A contract need 
not be fixed with complete and perfect certainty in order to have legal effect.”) (citing V’Soske 
v. Barwick, 404 F.2d 495, 500 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 921 (1969)).  
 55.  See Dorsey v. Clements, 44 S.E.2d 783, 787 (Ga. 1947) (following this principle).  
 56.  See Posner, supra note 53 at 1582 (“[P]erfect foresight is infinitely costly, so that, as 
the economic literature on contract interpretation emphasizes, the costs of foreseeing and 
providing for every possible contingency that may affect the costs of performance to either 
party over the life of the contract are prohibitive.”). 
 57.  Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Cont’l Ill. Corp., 658 F. Supp. 781, 789 
(N.D. Ill. 1987).  
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“When the conduct or expressions of parties to an agreement 
indicate a sufficient intent to make a contract, a court has latitude 
to fill in the gaps . . . [but] the courts should not impose on a party 
any performance to which he did not and probably would not have 
agreed.”
58
 
A number of decisions have used the implied incorporation doctrine to 
resolve gaps found with incomplete contracts.
59
  Nevertheless, the argument 
behind this practice is not persuasive.  The reason is that gap-filling default 
rules are matters of interpretation dependent on the intent of the parties, 
whereas the implied incorporation doctrine is a rule of construction adding 
terms dependent on the intent of the legislature.  Part IV.E explains this 
difference in greater depth. 
The above arguments regarding the relation of the implied 
incorporation doctrine and the U.C.C. have traction.  However, the 
justification for the implied incorporation doctrine in non-U.C.C. contracts 
is much more problematic as will be seen in the next part. 
II. THE UNSATISFACTORY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE 
CURRENT DOCTRINE 
Despite its established place in the legal firmament, and the existence 
of some merit especially for U.C.C.-covered contracts, the implied 
incorporation doctrine has numerous problematic justifications.  As will be 
shown below, the most common justifications — the conclusive 
presumptions that the parties know the law and the doctrine is an “implied” 
contract term — are different facets of the same solution for importing laws 
into a contract.  A third rationale, less frequently mentioned, is that this 
principle precludes contracting parties from abrogating valid laws. 
A. The Presumption that Every Person Knows the Law 
1. The Basic Standard 
Courts rely heavily on the “legal fiction” that every person is presumed 
to know the law.
60
  The canon also applies in the law of contract.  The 
 
 58.  Davis v. Dykman, 938 P.2d 1002, 1007 (Alaska 1997) (citations omitted).  
 59.  See infra Part III.B (analyzing decisions). 
 60.  See Heller v. District of Columbia, 801 F.3d 264, 285 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Henderson, 
J.) (concurring in part and dissenting part) (“[T]his presumption is a legal fiction, not an 
accurate description of the world.”). See also Peter J. Smith, New Legal Fictions, 95 GEO. L.J. 
1435, 1459-60, 1478-80 (2007) (citing the maxim that ignorance of the law is no defense as 
a prime example of a legal fiction). 
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“fundamental rule” is that parties are “presumed” (and even “conclusively 
presumed”) to know the law and to contract on that basis.
61
  Many decisions 
use the presumption to justify the implied incorporation doctrine.
62
 
In its correct version, the canon is not an affirmative finding that every 
party has positive knowledge of the law. Instead, the canon is phrased by the 
“ancient equity maxim, ignoranti juris non excusat (ignorance of the law is 
no excuse).
63
  Statutes help to fortify this common law doctrine.  By 
necessity, it is said, all persons have at a minimum constructive notice of 
statutes duly published in the U.S. Statutes at Large.
64
  Similarly, several 
federal statutes hold that publication of a regulation in the Federal Register 
and in the Code of Federal Regulations gives legal notice of their binding 
effect.
65
 
In the main, common law orthodoxy defends the presumption insofar 
as the law is “definite and knowable.”
66
  When courts do enforce this imputed 
intent, however, they have no illusions that every person actually does know 
the law.  Few, if any, courts could be that naive.
67
  Instead, the doctrine that 
 
 61.  E.g., Beckman v. Kan. Dept. of Human Res., 43 P.3d 891, 896 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002) 
(“‘[A] person is presumed to know the law and that contracts are made in contemplation of 
existing law which becomes a part of the contract.’”); Gibraltar Factors Corp. v. Slapo, 125 
A.2d 309, 309 (N.J. Super. A.D 1956) (“[I]t is elementary that all persons are conclusively 
presumed to know the law of the land, and ignorance thereof excuses no one. The law is a 
silent factor in every contract and the parties are presumed to have contracted with reference 
to it.”); Geiger v. Ashley, 193 S.E. 192, 193 (S.C. 1937) (“In addition, every one is presumed 
to know the law, and the law becomes a part of every contract.”); Inter-Ocean Cas. Co. v. 
Lenear, 95 S.W.2d 1355, 1358 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) (“It is a fundamental rule that 
contracting parties are conclusively presumed to have entered their contract with full 
knowledge of all of its terms and existing laws upon the subject which may affect the validity, 
formation, operation, discharge, interpretation, or enforcement thereof.”); Adams v. 
Spillyards, 61 S.W.2d 686, 687 (Ark. 1933) (“‘[P]arties are conclusively presumed to contract 
with reference to existing law.’”).  
 62.  See supra note 61. 
 63.  Hermes Consol., Inc. v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 409, 414 n.4 (2003) (citing 
authorities), rev’d on other grounds, Tesoro Hawaii Corp. v. United States, 405 F.3d 1339 
(Fed. Cir. 2005); see also Van Aalten v. Hurley, 176 F. Supp. 851, 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) 
(stating that the presumption that every person knows the law is an “inept expression of the 
general rule, founded on reasons of public policy, that ignorance of the law excuses no one.”).   
 64.  Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384 (1947); Neuser v. Hocker, 140 F. 
Supp.  2d 787, 801 (W.D. Mich. 1999) (“Without question, the imputation of knowledge by 
virtue of publication in the Statutes at Large ‘is something of a fiction . . . [;]’ however, it is a 
fiction ‘required in any system of law[.]’”) (quoting United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 
308 (1992) (Scalia, J. concurring)).  
 65.  See Louis Leustek & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 41 Fed.  Cl. 657, 669 (1999) (citing 
44 U.S.C. § 307 (1968) & 44 U.S.C. § 1507 (1968)) (finding that the applicable regulations 
were published in the Code of Federal Regulations, and as a result, the plaintiff contractor 
received notice of its opportunity to become involved in the discussions). 
 66.  Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991) (mentioning common law rule). 
 67.  See, e.g., Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384 (1947) 
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ignorance of the law is no defense is a substantive rule of law resting upon 
grounds of public policy so compelling as to override the normal 
requirements of evidence to prove a claim or a defense.
68
  The notion is that 
as a matter of public policy a legal system could not operate and contractors 
could not be held accountable if plaintiffs could successfully plead legal 
ignorance and burden courts with collateral inquiries through readily 
manipulable evidence on subjective understandings.
69
 
2. Criticisms of the Presumption 
Although courts frequently refer to the implied incorporation doctrine 
as a “presumption,”
70
 the presumption generally is “conclusive,” and not 
rebuttable.
71
  A conclusive presumption is simply a “fiction” whereby a rule 
of substantive law dons the disguise of a presumption.
72
  Conclusive 
presumptions are not true presumptions because they cannot be overcome by 
evidence or argument.
73
  Nonetheless, this Article will use the “presumption” 
nomenclature for identification purposes only because the cases still use the 
“presumption” terminology. 
The second criticism is that the maxim that all persons know the law “is 
a trite, sententious saying” that is “by no means universally true.”
74
  In the 
 
(acknowledging that Idaho farmers had no actual knowledge about the rules in the Federal 
Register on whether crops planted in the spring were insurable under the Federal Crop 
Insurance Act).  
 68.  See 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 201 (2016); see also United Cos. Lending Corp. v. 
Autry, 723 So. 2d 617, 621 (Ala. 1998) (“‘[T]he law enters into and defines the obligation of 
every contract and . . . [a]ll men are charged as a matter of public policy with a knowledge of 
the law pertaining to their transactions.’”). 
 69.  29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 290 (2014) (citing Provident Bank v. Lewitt, 852 A.2d 
852, 856 (Conn. Ct. App. 2004)). 
 70.  E.g., Nw. Nat. Gas Co. v. Chase Garden, Inc., 933 P.2d 370, 376 (Or. Ct. App. 1997) 
(describing the rule as “[a] presumption . . . .”). 
 71.  See Snyder v. Zane’s Ind. Sch. Dist., 860 S.W.2d 692, 697 (Tex. Civ. App. 1993) 
(“It is conclusively presumed that the parties to a contract knew the law and contracted with 
reference to it.”).  The asserted reluctance to inquire about a person’s subjective state of mind 
in this context is not defendable because courts routinely allow evidence of a party’s state of 
mind in contract cases.  See infra note 78-79 and accompanying text (citing duress, undue 
influence, fraud and mistake of law doctrines).   
 72.  Conclusive Presumption, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also LON 
L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 40-41 (1967) (“[C]onclusive presumption[s] are generally applied 
in precisely those cases where the fact assumed is false and known to be false.”). 
 73.  In re Estate of Zeno, 672 N.W.2d 574, 577 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (citing BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1204 (7th ed. 1999). See generally Joel S. Hjelmas, Stepping Back from the 
Thicket: A Proposal for the Treatment of Rebuttable Presumptions and Inferences, 42 DRAKE 
L. REV. 427, 433 (1993) (making this characterization of conclusive presumptions). 
 74.  JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, § 9:18, at 314 n.231 (7th ed. 2014) 
(quoting Municipal Metallic Bed Mfg. Corp. v. Dobbs, 171 N.E. 75, 76 (N.Y. 1930)). 
FELDMAN_FINAL_EIC ADJ (DO NOT DELETE) 11/30/2017  2:41 PM 
826 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 19.4 
 
context of the implied incorporation doctrine, some courts denigrate this 
presumption as perhaps “[t]he biggest legal fiction of all”
75
 and that as a 
“fiction” it “[h]as no place in a search for reality.”
76
  The current version of 
the Williston treatise is especially caustic in criticizing this presumption: 
An overstated and legally common utterance, so often pompously 
pronounced, is that ignorance of the law is no excuse.  While that 
seat-of-the-pants admonition is apropos and should be limited to 
criminal behavior, in the civil arena, this is a hard saying, much 
maligned and regularly relaxed in equity.  Indeed, this old rule as 
to ignorance of the law is subject to so many exceptions that it is 
inapplicable just about as often as it is applicable.77 
As just indicated, this conclusive presumption under the actual practice 
in the courts is not always “conclusive” — a better statement would be that 
“every person knows the law” — except when the law recognizes otherwise. 
Whether stated as a basis for affirmative relief or a defense to contract 
enforcement, the law on an equitable basis may indeed examine a party’s 
subjective knowledge of the law.  Some examples in the law of contracts are 
allegations of fraud, undue influence, and misplaced confidence; the victim 
can establish his lack of legal knowledge as an element that the perpetrator 
exploited in committing the wrongdoing.
78
  Mutual mistake of law can also 
be a basis for relief in contract disputes.
79
  Thus, “[the] presumption is 
[actually] rebuttable varying in force with the facts — strong in the case of a 
lawyer, or with respect to general laws which are matters of common 
knowledge, and weak, almost non-existent, in respect to details or to laws 
 
 75.  See Roldan v. Callahan & Blaine, 161 Cal. Rptr. 3d 493, 498 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
2013). See also In re Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 7 F. Supp. 1, 7 (E.D. Mo. 1934) (calling the 
“conclusive presumption” a “fiction”).  
 76.  Phx. Iron & Steel Co. v. Wilkoff Co., 253 F. 165, 171 (6th Cir. 1918).  
 77. See 27 SAMUEL L. WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS § 70:125 (4th ed. 1999). 
 78.  Ryles Homes, Inc. v. Briarwood, Inc., 34 Va. Cir. 223, at *1 (1994) (citing 
authorities).  
 79.  See Farrell v. Third Nat. Bank, 101 S.W.2d 158, 164 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1936): 
If both parties to a contract make an honest mistake of law as to its effect, or are 
ignorant of a matter of law and enter into the contract for a particular object, the 
result of which would by law be different from what they mutually intended, the 
court will interfere to prevent the enforcement of the contract, and relieve the 
parties from the unexpected consequences of it. *** And a mistake of law on the 
part of both contracting parties, owing to which the object of their contract cannot 
be attained, is sufficient ground for setting aside such contract. (citation omitted). 
 See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 151 cmt. b.; id. at § 155 (1981); 2 E. 
ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 9.2 (3d ed. 2004) (stating that most 
courts grant relief for mistake of law just as they would for mistake of fact). 
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which touch few persons.”
80
  Indeed, some long-standing decisions by 
several state supreme courts disagree that this presumption is conclusive.
81
 
The point, of course, is that if courts uphold the implied incorporation 
doctrine in lieu of examining party subjective understandings, contract law 
in other areas readily, and even routinely, admits such evidence.  The result 
is a key building block of the implied incorporation doctrine is greatly 
weakened.   
If the current common law doctrine is to be retained (which I do not 
advocate, per Part VI), my suggestion is that the adage “every person knows 
the law and intends to contract on that basis” should be transformed into a 
true rebuttable presumption.  As stated above, courts in equity “regularly 
relax” the rule that “every person knows the law.”
82
  In contract cases, 
equitable principles can favor rejecting the canon.  The reason is that binding 
parties to statutes and regulations physically absent from a contractual text 
merely because they are “applicable” is unfair to the non-moving party and 
harmful to the predictability of commercial relationships.  The foundation of 
contract will not buckle from this slight adjustment. 
Current doctrine is also unfair to non-moving parties (either promisors 
or promisees) because it allows the moving party (and a court) ex post to 
pick and choose among an undue number of laws and regulations as new 
contract rights or defenses when the parties never considered these laws and 
regulations ex ante.  In so doing, without consideration from the benefiting 
party, the law adds new rights or obligations that expose the non-moving 
party to considerable risk and liability “summarily created by mere 
implication” (and, one could add, “by ambush in litigation”).
83
 
The prevailing formulation harms the commercial system rather than 
safeguards it because the doctrine ex ante injects “considerable 
indefiniteness about the parties’ respective obligations under the contract” 
which could open a “Pandora’s box of potential problems and 
 
 80.  See 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 290 (2016) (quoting Schaffer v. Federal Trust Co., 
28 A.2d 75, 78 (N.J. Ch. 1942)).  
 81.  Hess v. Culver, 41 N.W. 994, 994 (Mich. 1889) (“But it has been held by this court 
in repeated instances that, while a man is, for public reasons, held responsible for his conduct, 
although ignorant of law, there is no conclusive presumption that he actually knows the law.”); 
Hart v. Roper, 41 N.C. 349, 349 (1849) (“The maxim, “ignorantia legis neminem excusat,” is 
founded upon the presumption that every one, competent to act for himself, knows the law; 
but the presumption that he knows it is not conclusive, but may be rebutted.”). See also Hesbol 
v. Bd. of Educ. of Laraway Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. 70-C, 14 F. Supp. 3d 1101, 1107 (N.D. 
Ill. 2014) (treating presumption as rebuttable in allowing party to present evidence that he was 
unaware of applicable law but ruling that the party was aware of the law because the contract 
referenced it). 
 82.  See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 83.  See infra note 270 and accompanying text. 
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disagreements.”
84
  Accordingly, courts should use their discretion to alter or 
reject a common law doctrine where, as here, the implied incorporation 
precept is counter-productive to the goals of a fair and rational legal system.
85
 
B. The Doctrine as an “Implied” Contract Term 
Courts have said that the doctrine is an implied contract term under the 
rubric of a “hypothetical bargain” and the case law is quite detailed in this 
regard.  Therefore, this Article will cover the following topics: overview of 
the hypothetical bargain; uncommunicated party intent and the hypothetical 
bargain; the disfavored nature of implied contract terms; whether the implied 
incorporation doctrine is a true implied term; and contracts as private 
ordering. 
1. Overview of the “Hypothetical Bargain” 
Ordinarily, the four corners of the contract document set the boundary 
for the parties’ rights and duties, but the implied incorporation rule is an 
exception to this principle.
86
  As Judge Richard A. Posner commented for the 
Seventh Circuit in Selcke v. New England Insurance Co., “a contract is the 
sum of its express and implied terms.”
87
  He also said, “statutes are a source 
of implied contractual terms, . . . .”
88
  Therefore, as Judge Benjamin Cardozo 
observed for the New York Court of Appeals, when courts incorporate laws 
into the contract by implication, “[t]hey do not change the [contract] 
obligation.  They make it what it is.”
89
  Despite their well-deserved place in 
the legal pantheon, Judges Posner and Cardozo do not sufficiently 
acknowledge that this doctrine is an elaborate legal fiction, what the courts 
call a “hypothetical bargain.”
90
 
The argument favoring construing laws as implied contract terms in the 
hypothetical bargain is that courts must understand contracts according to 
 
 84.  Nat’l Leased Housing Ass’n v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 762, 766 (1995), aff’d, 105 
F.3d 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1997).  A line of precedents in the Federal Circuit mention this same 
concern regarding over-incorporation.  See infra Part V.  
 85.  15A AM. JUR. 2D Common Law § 13 (2016) (“court[s] should not be bound by an 
early common-law rule unless it is supported by reason and logic”) (citing cases). 
 86.  Fox v. Heimann, 872 N.E.2d 126, 136 (Ill. Ct. App. 2007). 
 87.  995 F.2d 688, 689-90 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 88.  Id. at 689. 
 89.  People ex rel. City of New York v. Nixon, 128 N.E. 245, 247 (N.Y. 1920). 
 90.  See Schortman v. United States, 92 Fed. Cl. 154, 164 (2010) (using the terms 
“hypothetical bargain” and “hypothetical model of the bargaining process”). 
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the “expectations and understandings”
91
 of reasonably intelligent parties
92
 
wherein the signatories naturally expect and desire to be subject to governing 
laws
93
 (be they municipal, state or federal laws).
94
  Thus, so it goes, courts 
incorporating laws are not reading into the contract terms any different from 
those intended by the parties, but are faithfully construing the contract in 
accordance with the parties’ true intent.
95
 
The hypothetical bargain construct is so strong that courts can imply 
terms “even where the contract itself is not ambiguous”
96
 and where the 
contract contains a merger or integration clause, i.e., a clause stating that the 
written terms of the contact constitute the sole agreement of the parties 
excluding all extrinsic circumstances.
97
  However, this analysis is faulty.  The 
reason is that when they use the “hypothetical bargain” construct in 
classifying laws as implied terms, courts do so in conclusory fashion with no 
effort to tie the parties’ contemplation of the law as revealed by trial evidence 
of the parties’ intent.
98
 
Still other courts have no misgivings about the doctrine.  A Maryland 
Court of Special Appeals decision views this legal fiction as so obviously 
valid and based on “commonsense [that] even a person with little legal 
knowledge would be loathe to think that a contract is not subject to existing 
laws unless they are expressly incorporated.”
99
 
On a deeper level, the hypothetical bargain construct violates bedrock 
principles of contract law.  Thus, for example, indefinite contracts can be 
 
 91.  Md. Cas. Co. v. Turner, 403 F. Supp. 907, 912 (W.D. Okla. 1975) (explaining that 
a chief purpose of contract law is to effectuate reasonably induced expectations and 
understandings). 
 92.  Lockheed Support Servs., Inc. v. United States, 36 Fed. Cl. 424, 428 (1996). 
 93.  See P.R. Dep’t of Labor and Human Res. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 24, 31 (2001) 
(claiming that not only are parties presumed to be aware of applicable statutes but are further 
presumed that they intend to follow them); accord Ocean View Towers Assocs. v. United 
States, 88 Fed. Cl. 169, 176 (2009). See also Resolution Tr. Corp. v. Diamond, 45 F.3d 665, 
673 (2d Cir. 1995) (“When parties enter into a contract, they are presumed to accept all the 
rights and obligations imposed on their relationship by state (or federal) law.”). 
 94.  In re Doctors Hosp. of Hyde Park, Inc., 337 F.3d at 957 (citing Kansas law); 
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Diamond, 45 F.3d 665, 673 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 95.  11 SAMUEL L.  WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS § 30:19 (4th ed. 1999) (citing Schiro v. W.E. Gould & Co., 165 N.E.2d 286 (Ill. 
1960)). 
 96.  Huang v. BP Amoco Corp., 271 F.3d 560, 564-65 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 97.  See, e.g., Seashore Performing Arts Ctr. v. Town of Old Orchard Beach, 676 A.2d 
482, 484 (Me. 1996) (providing that contracts with an integration clause “may include” an 
unwritten implied term).  
 98.  See Fox v. Heimann, 872 N.E.2d 126, 136 (Ill. Ct. App. 2007) (“‘The rationale for 
this rule is that the parties to the contract would have expressed that which the law implies 
had they not supposed that it was unnecessary to speak of it because the law provides for 
it.’”).  
 99.  Wickman v. Kane, 766 A.2d 241, 248 (Md.  Ct. Spec. App. 2011). 
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unenforceable.  Courts have acknowledged, “[a] contract cannot be enforced 
if it is not specific with respect to all of the essential terms of a contract.”
100
  
Notwithstanding these well-established concepts, courts have indicated that 
no problem exists with regard to the implied incorporation doctrine and 
definiteness.  Their reasoning is the implied term is, and was from the 
inception, as much a part of the contract as the express terms and so courts 
say no issues exist regarding indefinite contracts.
101
  The counter-argument 
here is that if it becomes necessary to include a statute by reference then that 
omission is always sufficiently glaring to render the transaction 
unenforceable. 
Other opposing legal canons are in tension with the above reasoning 
that the rule comports with the requirement of contractual completeness.  For 
example, courts continually emphasize that they must not “rewrite” a 
contract.
102
  In view of this policy, courts have ruled that before the court 
may incorporate a new term, the bar must be raised such that the implication 
must be clear and undoubted, based on legal necessity, but not on simple 
fairness, wisdom, or prudence.
103
  According to this standard, a court will 
imply a contract term only where the court can plainly determine from the 
contract that the obligation or duty was necessarily or indispensably included 
within the contemplation of the parties, such that the parties either deemed it 
too obvious to need expression, through “sheer inadvertence” failed to 
 
 100.  OfficeMax, Inc. v. Sapp, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1085 (M.D. Ga. 2011) (emphasis 
supplied). See generally Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 
103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641 (2003) (explaining common law rule).  
 101.  See Linton v. E.C. Cates Agency, Inc., 113 P.3d 26, 30 (Wyo. 2004) (stating that 
“[i]ndefiniteness may also be cured by the addition of such implied terms as will be supplied 
by law . . . .”). See also Top of the Track Assocs. v. Lewiston Raceways, Inc., 654 A.2d 1293, 
1296 (Me. 1995) (“As a matter of contract law, a term that is implied in a contract has the 
same legal effect as an express term.”). 
 102.  See, e.g., Emerson v. Treadway, 270 S.W.2d 614, 622 (Mo. Ct. App. 1954) (“We are 
confined to interpretation and enforcement of the contract the parties made for themselves, 
and we cannot alter or rewrite it under the guise of judicial construction.”); accord In re Yates 
Development, 256 F.3d 1285, 1289 (11th Cir. 2001) (“‘[i]t is never the role of a . . . court to 
rewrite a contract to make it more reasonable for one of the parties or to relieve a party from 
what turned out to be a bad bargain.’”); Sw. E & T Suppliers, Inc. v. Am. Enka Corp., 463 
F.2d 1165, 1166 (5th Cir. 1972) (stating “[c]ourts cannot read into a contract that which is not 
there.”); In re UNR Industries, Inc., 212 B.R. 295, 305 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997) (explaining 
that a “‘strong presumption’” exists against rewriting a contract to include provisions that 
could have been, but were not, included). 
 103.  See Giessow Restaurants, Inc. v. Richmond Rests., Inc., 232 S.W.3d 576, 579 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 2007); Birdsong v. Bydalek, 953 S.W.2d 103, 118 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); Weatherly 
v. Am. Agr. Chem. Co, 65 S.W.2d 592, 598 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1933) (indicating that there is a 
heightened standard to incorporate terms that were not within the contemplation of the parties 
at the time the contract was initially negotiated). See also Tiegs v. Boise Cascade Corp., 922 
P.2d 115, 123-24 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (providing extensive discussion of implied 
covenants). 
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express it, or the term is necessary to carry out their intentions.
104
  While 
courts have specifically applied this standard to the implied incorporation 
doctrine,
105
 they paint with too broad a brush by saying every relevant law is 
“indispensable” to satisfy the parties’ intent. 
As can be seen, the implied intent doctrine law relies upon one legal 
fiction - parties are presumed to know and follow the law - to justify another 
fiction — the contract by necessary implication contains all terms needed to 
save the contract from being voided for lack of definitiveness.
106
  The 
question arises, however, by what judicial imperative must every dispute 
have a contractual solution and why is that approach superior to leaving the 
parties where the court finds them?  Many years ago, Corbin pointed out that 
the mere fact that a contract does not address every potential dispute does 
not dictate that a court must construe the contract to do so: 
Only the least thought is necessary to realize that a “gap” in an 
agreement should not be filled merely because a gap exists.  No 
promise, or condition of a promise, should be added by either 
implication or judicial construction, merely because the parties did 
not put it in their words of agreement . . . A promise that is not 
there in language, or an unexpressed condition of an expressed 
promise, should be put in by process of implication only when the 
conduct of the parties reasonably interpreted already has expressed 
it.  It should be put in by construction of law, in the absence of 
justified implication, only when justice imperiously demands it 
under the circumstances that have arisen.
107
 
Therefore, extrapolating from Corbin’s position on implied terms, a 
court may incorporate a law into a contract on a case-by-case basis where 
the particular parties by their conduct previously expressed a desire to 
 
 104.  Sacramento Nav. Co. v. Salz, 273 U.S. 326, 329 (1927); Refinery Emps. Union of 
Lake Charles Area v. Cont. Oil Co., 160 F. Supp. 723, 731 (W.D. La. 1958); Foley v. Euless, 
6 P.2d 956, 958 (Cal. 1931); 11 SAMUEL L. WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON 
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 31:7 (4th ed. 1999). Consistent with the rule that courts do not 
rewrite contracts, some cases say implied terms are proper only when “absolutely necessary” 
to effectuate the parties’ intent.  E.g., Bishop’s Prop. & Investments, LLC v. Protective Life 
Ins. Co., 255 F.R.D. 619, 625-26 (M.D. Ga. 2009) (explaining that “courts are ‘generally 
reluctant to make contracts for the parties’ but may imply promises ‘when . . . absolutely 
necessary to introduce the term to effectuate the intention of the parties.’”). See also Top of 
the Track Assocs. v. Lewiston Raceways, Inc., 654 A.2d 1293, 1296 (Me. 1995) (approving 
absolute necessity rule). 
 105.  E.g., Schiro v. W.E. Gould & Co., 165 N.E.2d 286, 290 (Ill. 1960); Fox v. Heimann, 
872 N.E.2d 126, 136 (Ill. Ct. App. 2007). 
 106.  See Linton v. E.C. Cates Agency, Inc., 113 P.3d 26, 30 (Wyo. 2004). See also Randy 
E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 
821, 823 (1992) (“That such implied-in-law terms are based on the parties’ consent has long 
been thought to be pure fiction.”). 
 107.  3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 569 at 341 (rev. ed. 1960). 
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include it in the agreement.  Otherwise, as stated above, Corbin argues that 
a court may include a law as a required term only as dictated by an 
“imperious” sense of justice under the particular circumstances.  In other 
words, the question of implied incorporation for Corbin never occurs in the 
abstract.  Because courts in their decisions do not apply the implied 
incorporation doctrine on a case by case basis, but treat it as a mandatory 
rule irrespective of any specific evidence that the parties actually had this 
intent,
108
 the implied incorporation doctrine has faulty underpinnings. 
More difficulties lie in wait even if the court ventures forth into the facts 
to determine this reconstruction of earlier events.  If a court adheres to the 
Corbin formulation that the issue depends on the particular factual 
circumstances, determining what the parties “would have agreed to” under a 
hypothetical scenario presents significant problems of proof. 
With regard to these evidentiary issues, a hindsight contention of what 
laws the parties would have included if brought to their attention would be a 
self-serving effort to gain a litigation advantage.  Courts also have ruled that 
expert testimony on this likely intent also is inadmissible.
109
  Therefore, the 
likelihood is that even as the law allows in theory the post-hoc argument of 
the parties’ likely intent, the law seemingly cuts off all evidence that could 
conceivably shed light on the moving party’s theory. 
The temptation is ever-present that given the paucity of reliable 
evidence, the court enforcing a hypothetical bargain would impose the 
inclusion of laws by implication according to its own conceptions of the just 
and the right instead of a search for the parties’ mutual commitments.
110
  “To 
supply terms, a legal decision maker must make policy choices, which is well 
beyond the fiction that the court is merely following the directives of the 
 
 108.  See supra note 96 and accompanying text.  Query whether Corbin himself was being 
consistent on the validity of the implied incorporation doctrine.  In one section of his treatise, 
he argued that laws are not part of a contract unless agreed to by the parties, 3 ARTHUR L. 
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 551 at 202 (rev. ed. 1960), but in another place he accepts 
promises supplied by law when justice “imperiously demands it under the circumstances,” 3 
ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 569 at 341 (rev. ed. 1960). 
 109.  SR Int’l Bus. Ins. v. World Trade Ctr., 222 F. Supp. 2d 385, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(rejecting expert testimony on the terms the parties ultimately would have selected upon the 
close of negotiations). 
 110.  See Martin v. Schumaker, 417 N.E.2d 541, 543-44 (N.Y. 1981) (recommending, in 
construing a contract, “a court, in intervening, [should not] impos[e] its own conception of 
what the parties should or might have undertaken, [but should instead] confin[e] itself to the 
implementation of a bargain to which they have mutually committed themselves.”). See also 
St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Duke Univ., 849 F.2d 133, 135 (4th Cir. 1988) (“Were courts free to refuse 
to enforce contracts as written on the basis of their own conceptions of the public good, the 
parties to contracts would be left to guess at the content of their bargains, and the stability of 
commercial relations would be jeopardized.”). 
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parties.”
111
 
The hypothetical bargain rationale fails insofar as it places the court in 
the realm of speculation versus the world of the parties’ actual agreement.  
As Judge Frank Easterbrook commented in an opinion for the Seventh 
Circuit, the goal of achieving certainty in commercial relationships could be 
defeated if courts prefer hypothetical bargains “over real ones.”
112
  Because 
the implied incorporation doctrine has been around since at least 1806, this 
principle and its reliance on a hypothetical bargain will not be carted off the 
legal landscape any time soon.  To confine the doctrine to the extent that it 
makes sense for the commercial system, the succeeding sections of this part 
will further analyze this flawed doctrine with the hope that courts and 
lawmakers will accept a more modest version of it (which proposal is found 
in Part VI).
113
 
2. Uncommunicated Party Intent and the Hypothetical Bargain 
The preceding section revealed that a number of cases construing the 
implied incorporation doctrine rely upon the hypothetical bargain solution.
114
  
A serious problem with the hypothetical bargain standard – by definition an 
unspoken pact – is that courts must necessarily give weight to the purely 
subjective understandings of the parties.  As will be seen below, courts in 
contract disputes generally reject evidence of the parties’ uncommunicated 
intent. 
In the related area of contract interpretation, evidence outside the four 
corners of the document on what one or both parties subjectively “really 
intended,” but where such intent is undocumented in the contract, is 
generally “inadmissible to add to or vary the writing.”
115
  Under the 
 
 111.  See Jean Braucher, Contract Versus Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role of 
Contract Law, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 697, 733 (1990) (observing that supplying a term on 
a court’s judgment of what the parties agreed to is a “fictitious” exercise of ascertaining party 
consent and that “[t]he parties cannot control in advance what they do not even 
contemplate.”).  Notably, the U.C.C. does not fill in a gap on a missing quantity merely 
because it exists.  A good example of where the U.C.C. directs that courts should leave parties 
where it finds them is under U.C.C. § 2-201, which requires a stated quantity for an 
enforceable contract.  U.C.C. § 2-201 cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST. 2011-2012) (“The only term 
which must appear is the quantity term which need not be accurately stated but recovery is 
limited to the amount stated.”). 
 112.  See Cont’l Bank v. Everett, 964 F.2d 701, 705 (7th Cir.  1992) (stating that there is 
no implied duty for a bank secured creditor to disclose the riskiness of collateral to a 
guarantor). 
 113.  See Part VI (providing a proposal for reforming the implied incorporation doctrine). 
 114.  See supra Part III.B.1. 
 115.  W.W.W. Assocs. v. Giacontieri, 566 N.E.2d 639, 642 (N.Y. 1990).  As stated in Part 
IV.E, contract interpretation is related to, but different from, contract construction, and the 
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prevailing “objective” standard” for contract interpretation, courts focus on 
what the parties expressed to each other and not on what they merely thought 
about the contract.  Ordinarily, the law does not give weight to the 
conflicting, uncommunicated subjective intent of a party.
116
  The cases agree: 
“The status of a document as a contract depends on what the parties express 
to each other and to the world, not on what they kept to themselves.”
117
  
“Because [an] . . . approach [giving weight to uncommunicated intent] relies 
on evidence inaccessible to the promisee, much less to third parties, [the 
result] would undermine the security of transactions by greatly reducing the 
reliability of contractual commitments.”
118
 
The hypothetical bargain theory cannot stand with other cases 
disapproving such speculative evidence.  This hypothetical device and the 
reliance on what the parties naturally thought about their deal contradicts the 
fundamental principle dating back to 1847 that courts should construe a 
contract without “regard either to the probable intention of the parties 
contracting, or to the probable changes which they would be made in their 
contract, had they foreseen certain contingencies.”
119
  The U.S. Court of 
Federal Claims has observed, “resolving the reasonableness inquiry by 
reference to the parties’ intentions seems misguided, particularly, since the 
issue is not one of interpretation, and, especially, where . . . there is reason 
to believe that the parties might not have easily reached accord on the critical 
point.”
120
  The court here was adverting to the well-known distinction 
between contract “interpretation,” which centers on the meaning of the 
words to the contract, and contract “construction,” which determines the 
legal effect and operation of the contract.
121
  Other courts say in general that 
the absence of a provision from a contract is actually more probative of the 
intent to exclude it than to include it.
122
 
 
implied incorporation doctrine is a matter of contract construction. 
 116.  See generally Higbee v. Sentry Ins. Co., 253 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2001); Thornock 
v. Pacific Corp, 379 P.3d 175, 180 (Wyo. 2016); Ivison v. Ivison, 762 So. 2d 329, 335 (Miss. 
2000); Kozy v. Werle, 902 S.W.2d 404, 411 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (refusing to consider the 
subjective intent of a party). 
 117.  Skycom Corp. v. Telstar Corp., 813 F.2d 810, 814-15 (7th Cir. 1987) (observing that 
“[i]f unilateral or secret intents could bind, parties would become wary, and the written word 
would lose some of its power.”). 
 118.  Randy Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 273 (1986).   
 119.  Nicholson v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 180, 191 (1996) (citing WILLIAM W. STORY, 
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1847)). But see Unihealth v. U.S. Healthcare, 
Inc., 14 F. Supp. 2d 623, 633 (D.N.J. 1998) (observing that New Jersey courts broadly search 
for the “probable common intent of the parties,” the attendant circumstances, and the parties’ 
objectives to derive a reasonable meaning of the contract terms).   
 120.  Schortman v. United States, 92 Fed. Cl. 154, 164 (2010) (emphasis supplied). 
 121.  See infra Part IV.F (explaining the conceptual difference). 
 122.  See Parker Beach Restoration, Inc. v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 126, 130 (2003) 
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The irony is that courts unapologetically depart from the objective 
standard when they rely on the parties’ supposed uncommunicated 
subjective intentions about applicable law.  The Illinois Court of Appeals 
implicitly acknowledged it was approving uncommunicated issues of intent 
when it said, “‘[t]he rationale for the rule is that the parties to the contract 
would have expressed that which the law implies had they not supposed that 
it was unnecessary to speak of it because the law provides for it.’”
123
 
The better (and prevailing) view is that a party’s intent or understanding 
about the contract, uncommunicated to the other party by word, action, or 
circumstance, is generally  inadmissible as a matter of law.
124
  Therefore, if 
the contract text omits applicable law, but one or even both parties merely 
subjectively understood the contract to include all applicable laws, this belief 
lacks binding effect, irrespective of whether the issue is contract 
interpretation or contract construction. 
3. The Disfavored Status of Implied Contract Terms 
Courts broadly view that assigning an implied contract term is 
appropriate where the term is “necessary”
125
 or “indispensable”
126
 to give 
effect to the intent of the parties.  Yet courts also insist they have a difficult 
task in deriving an implied term and implied terms are disfavored.
127
  As a 
Mississippi Supreme Court case observes, 
[U]nless the implication be indispensable or inescapable, courts 
will be reluctant to embark upon the dangerous venture of 
importing into an agreement, by declaratory resort to implication, 
what so far as the court may definitely know was not at the moment 
of the contract actually agreed upon by the parties, and particularly 
must this be true where, as here, the parties have at much pains and 
 
(quoting Azalea Park Utils., Inc. v. Knox-Florida Dev. Corp., 127 So. 2d 121, 123 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1961)). 
 123.  Fox v. Heimann, 872 N.E.2d 126, 136 (Ill. Ct. App. 2007). 
 124.  See Thornock v. Pacific Corp, 379 P.3d 175, 180 (Wyo. 2016) (stating that a party’s 
subjective intent is not relevant or admissible); Kozy v. Werle, 902 S.W.2d 404, 411 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. 1995) (finding uncommunicated intent non-probative). See also Ivison, 762 So. 2d 
at 335 (“We are ‘concerned with what the contracting parties have said to each other, not 
some secret thought of one [that was] not communicated to the other.’”).  For a variation in 
fraud, duress, and the like, see supra note 79-80 and accompanying text. 
 125.  Foley v. Huntington Co., 682 A.2d 1026, 1038 (Conn. Ct. App. 1996). 
 126.  Alta Vista Props., LLC v. Mauer Vision Ctr., PC, 855 N.W.2d 722, 727 (Iowa 2014). 
See also Del. & Hudson Canal Co. v. Pa. Coal Co., 75 U.S. 276, 288 (1868) (leading decision). 
 127.  See Rote v. Rayco DS Inc., 148 F.3d 672, 674 (7th Cir. 1998) (observing that most 
states disfavor implied terms in lease contracts); Series AGI West Linn of Appian Group 
Investors De LLC v. Eves, 158 Cal. Rptr. 3d 193, 203-04 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) 
(discussing the arguments against implied terms). 
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in detail undertaken to reduce their agreement to such specific 
written terms as to evince their purpose to expressly cover every 
phase of their understanding.
128
 
No cases were found where a court performed the necessary fact finding 
that the parties intended to be bound by applicable law missing from the 
contract and it was indispensable or inescapable under the facts to 
incorporate such terms. 
4. Is the Doctrine a True “Implied” Term? 
Another significant problem with the implied incorporation principle is 
that if existing laws are truly implied terms then such terms are subject to the 
general rule that implied terms cannot vary or override the contract’s express 
terms, do not establish new terms, and can only attach to the performance of 
a particular contractual obligation.  They do not exist as an independent 
source of contractual rights or obligations.
129
 
Another restraint is that a court may not supply an implied term when 
the parties have either dealt expressly with the matter in the contract or have 
deliberately left the contract silent on the point (although how courts are 
supposed to conclude that silence without more can be probative of such 
intent is unexplained).
130
  After diligent research, I found just one jurisdiction 
applying the general rules of restraint to the implied incorporation 
doctrine.
131
  In the run of cases, however, courts almost invariably (and 
inappropriately) deem the doctrine to be a free standing basis for supporting 
 
 128.  Goff v. Jacobs, 145 So. 728, 729 (Miss. 1933) (citations omitted) (emphasis 
supplied).   
 129.  See Mem’l Hosp. of Laramie Cty. v. Healthcare Realty Tr. Inc., 509 F.3d 1225, 1236 
(10th Cir. 2007) (determining that the duty of good faith requires such treatment of contracts); 
United States ex. rel. Norbeck v. Basin Elec., 248 F.3d 781, 796 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating that 
good faith should not carry with it new duties); Burger King Corp. v. Weaver, 169 F.3d 1310, 
1315-16  (11th Cir. 1999) (finding that courts have been inconsistent in applying the duty of 
good faith in the franchise context); Spiegler v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 552 F. Supp. 2d 
1036, 1053-54 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (requiring that the duty of good faith be flexible to ensure 
compliance with the contract, but it cannot give rise to duties or limits beyond such 
compliance). See also Brown v. Mid-Am. Waste Sys., 924 F. Supp. 92, 94–95 (S.D. Ind. 
1996) (“The existence of express terms in a valid contract thus precludes the substitution of 
Implied terms regarding matters covered by the contract’s express terms.”); R.H. Sanders 
Corp. v. Hayes, 541 S.W.2d 262, 265 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (existing law is incorporated into 
a contract where it can be done “without doing violence to the contract terms”). 
 130.  So Good Potato Chip Co. v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 462 F.2d 239, 241 (8th Cir. 1972) (“A 
covenant cannot be implied if the parties have either expressly dealt with the matter in the 
contract or have left the agreement intentionally silent on the point.”). 
 131.  See In re Wolfe, 378 B.R. 96, 102-03 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2007) (making the connection 
explicitly). 
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or resisting the existence of a contractual liability.
132
 
In truth, most opinions make no serious effort to fit the implied 
incorporation doctrine within the rubric of the hypothetical bargain 
approach.  Instead, the courts mechanically construe applicable laws as 
judicially mandated based on the distinct and more malleable concept of 
“relevancy” or “applicability” to the subject matter of the contract.
133
 
5. Contracts as Private Ordering 
The far-ranging ramifications of the implied incorporation doctrine can 
rob the contract of its basic nature as a consensual arrangement and a form 
of “private ordering.”
134
  Contracts are discrete documents and not legal 
encyclopedias in the cloud.
135
  A particularly serious danger associated with 
the implied incorporation doctrine is that when courts construe it too broadly, 
“it could become an all-embracing statement of the parties’ obligations under 
contract law, imposing unintended obligations upon parties and destroying 
the mutual benefits created by legally binding agreements.”
136
  Such a non-
textual, free standing doctrine creates a sizeable risk that a party could be 
trapped by a surprise obligation (and likely additional costs) that the party 
did not consider ex ante in the contract’s allocation of duties and 
responsibilities and the amount of  consideration.
137
 
 
 132.  See supra Part III.B.1.  
 133.  See supra notes 27-41 and accompanying text.  See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 204 (1981) (noting that these terms “[are] supplied by the court”); 2 E. ALLAN 
FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 7.16 at 552 (3d ed. 2004) (preferring the term 
“supplied” as opposed to “implied in law”). 
 134.  See Martin v. Schumaker, 417 N.E.2d 541, 543 (N.Y. 1983) (noting the “basic 
observation” that a contract is a “private ordering”). See also Isler v. Tex. Oil & Gas Corp., 
749 F.2d 22, 23-24 (10th Cir. 1984) (stating that the essential nature of contract law is the 
formation of relationships that allocate duties); Krug v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 320 P.3d 
1012, 1022 (Okla. 2013) (“The essential principle of contract law is the consensual formation 
of relationships with bargained-for duties[.]”).   
 135.  The analogy here is to “cloud” computer technology, which refers to a group of 
connected machines with storage drives and processors that becomes an extension of a local 
computer.  See Balaji Viswanathan, What is the Cloud? Can it be Explained in Terms that a 
Non-technical Person Can Understand?, QUORA (last updated Sept. 2, 2014), 
https://www.quora.com/What-is-the-cloud-Can-it-be-explained-in-terms-that-a-non-
technical-person-can-understand [https://perma.cc/5TSA-TRJE] (outlining the basic aspects 
of the cloud computer system). 
 136.  Cf. Brunswick Hills Racquet Club, Inc. v. Route 18 Shopping Ctr. Assocs., 864 A.2d 
387, 399 (N.J. 2005) (construing the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing). 
 137.  See 1 PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O’CONNOR, JR., BRUNER AND O’CONNOR ON 
CONSTRUCTION LAW § 3:65 (2015) (observing that a common outcome of an implied 
incorporation dispute in construction contracts is the promisor will incur “more costs than 
otherwise would have been the case”).  Compare Arcadian Phosphates, Inc. v. Arcadian 
Corp., 884 F.2d 69, 72 (2d Cir. 1989) (“‘[A] primary concern for courts . . . is to avoid 
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The concept of private ordering draws its strength from the notion that 
the parties as free agents must manifest their mutual assent.  The California 
Supreme Court has said that this voluntary nature of contracting is essential.  
In Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. v. Dana Corp.,
138
 the court commented that 
“‘[W]hen two parties make a contract, they agree upon the rules and 
regulations which will govern their relationship; the risks inherent in the 
agreement and the likelihood of its breach.’”
139
  Clearly, the parties under the 
implied incorporation doctrine do not voluntarily agree to the inclusion of 
unmentioned laws; the courts do that for them based on what are flawed 
justifications.
140
  The Robinson court further observed: 
The parties to the contract . . . create a mini-universe for 
themselves, in which . . .  they define their respective obligations, 
rewards and risks.  Under such a scenario, it is appropriate to 
enforce only such obligations as each party voluntarily assumed, 
and to give him only such benefits as he expected to receive; this 
is the function of contract law.
141
 
Sensitive to this fundamental aspect of contract law, some courts and 
commentators criticize the parties’ “implied intent” rationale as an obvious 
legal fiction unmoored to the traditional principles of mutual assent.
142
  A 
court that adds an implied provision in this questionable manner would 
“make it impossible” for parties to rely on written contract terms addressing 
their duties and responsibilities.
143
  A pervasive theme of this Article is it can 
never be known ex ante which unmentioned law or regulation a party or court 
may deem ex post to be included by operation of law.  Rational contractors 
do not subscribe wholesale to the unknown and frequently unknowable 
 
trapping parties in surprise contractual obligations that they never intended.’”) (quoting 
Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of Am. v. Tribune Co., 670 F. Supp. 491, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 
1987)). A line of precedents in the Federal Circuit mention this same concern regarding over-
incorporation. See infra Part V. 
 138.  102 P.3d 268 (Cal. 2004).   
 139.  Id. at 275 (quoting Applied Equip. Co. v. Litton Saudi Arabia, 869 P.2d 454, 462 
(Cal. 1994)). 
 140.  See supra Part III.B (analyzing decisions). 
 141.  Robinson, 102 P.3d at 275. 
 142.  See Lloyd v. Cincinnati Checker Cab Co., 36 N.E.2d 67, 69 (Ohio Dist. Ct. App. 
1941) (stating that doctrine is “obviously, therefore, not a contractual liability involving a 
meeting of the minds, but a purely statutory obligation.  Reading the statute into the contract 
involves a pure fiction.”); 11 SAMUEL L.  WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE 
LAW OF CONTRACTS § 30:21 (4th ed. 1999) (“rule is obviously artificial” and an “unfortunate 
fiction”); Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 
78 VA. L. REV. 821, 822-23 (1992) (“That such implied-in-law terms are based on the parties’ 
consent has long been thought to be pure fiction.”). 
 143.  Rothe v. Reyco D.S., Inc., 148 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 1998). 
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catalog of potentially relevant laws.
144
  It should therefore come as no 
surprise that several justices of the United States Supreme Court, which has 
recognized the implied incorporation doctrine since at least 1827, have 
acknowledged “it is somewhat misleading” to characterize laws affecting the 
enforceability of contracts as incorporated terms of a contract.
145
 
C. The Policy Against Abrogation of Existing Laws 
Another rationale that contracts must be subject to existing, relevant 
laws is that private parties may not abrogate or override laws enacted from 
public concern.
146
  The Texas Court of Civil Appeals has commented, 
Statutes are often passed to protect persons against the effects of 
certain types of contract.  The purpose of such statutes would be 
defeated if their effect could be avoided by contract, and . . . if such 
is the legislative intent, covenants attempting to avoid the 
provisions of such statutes are void.
147
   
Thus, the doctrine holds that if the parties were to exempt themselves 
from the operation of law by contract, such an abrogation should be 
ineffective. 
To advance this policy against the abrogation of existing laws, the 
general rule is that “[o]ne whose rights . . . are subject to state restriction, 
cannot remove them from the power of the State by making a contract about 
them.”
148
  Every contract has the implied condition, regardless of whether it 
is included in the contractual text, that the State’s police power is part of the 
contract as an aspect of sovereignty and this power is “paramount” to the 
parties’ individual contract rights.
149
  The “police power” refers to the state’s 
right “[t]o protect the lives, health, morals, comfort, and general welfare of 
 
 144.  See 3 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 551 at 197-98 (rev. ed. 
1960) (observing that “[w]ith respect to any particular contract most of the statutes and rules 
are irrelevant; and most of those that are relevant are unknown to the parties.”).   
 145.  Gen. Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 189 (1992).  
 146.  See Church Mut. Ins. Co. v. Klein, 940 P.2d 1001, 1003 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996) 
(reasoning that laws crafted to serve the public good cannot be avoided by private contract); 
Cary v. Cary, 675 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984). 
 147.  Southlands Life Ins. Co. v. Hopkins, 219 S.W. 254, 260 (Tex. Civ. App.  1920) 
(quoting 1 WILLIAM HERBERT PAGE, PAGE ON CONTRACTS § 355, at 550 (1905)), rev’d on 
other grounds, 244 S.W. 989 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922). 
 148.  Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 357 (1908). 
 149.  U.S. Tr. Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22 (1977); E. N.Y. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 
230, 232-33 (1945); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 437 (1934); Smith 
v. Commonwealth, 743 S.E.2d 146, 150 (Va. 2013); Storck v. Cities Serv. Gas Co., 575 P.2d 
1364 (Okla. 1977) (holding that the right of the legislature to act under the police power is 
part of existing law at contract formation). 
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the people.”
150
  Accordingly, the paramount right of the State to intervene in 
a contractual relationship will prevail over the parties’ rights in their 
agreements.
151
 
Different corollaries to the implied incorporation doctrine contradict the 
anti-abrogation policy.  A strong majority of jurisdictions allow parties to 
agree that applicable laws are not so included.  For example, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit observed in construing Maryland law, “‘the 
general rule [is] that parties to a contract are presumed to contract mindful 
of the existing law and that all applicable or relevant laws must be read into 
the agreement of the parties just as if expressly provided by them, except 
where a contrary intention is evident.’”
152
  One would also think that in line 
with U.S. Supreme Court precedent, a party could not evade state law simply 
by drawing up a contract that makes the law inapplicable.
153
  One would 
further think that even under a broad view of freedom of contract, i.e., the 
parties’ ability to strike an agreement to protect their own best interests, there 
is no valid liberty interest for parties to contravene law or public policy by 
exempting themselves via contract from the statute’s purview.
154
 
In a sense, the implied incorporation doctrine is the converse of the rule 
that a court will not enforce a contract violative of a statute or regulation.  
Citing numerous precedents, the Tennessee Court of Appeals in Ledbetter v. 
Townsend commented, “[i]t is well settled that [a court] will not enforce 
obligations arising out of a contract or transaction that is illegal” and ruled 
that “Tennessee courts will leave the parties to an illegal contract where they 
are found, refusing to aid either party.”
155
  The asserted rationale for non-
enforcement of illegal contracts is that it would be “absurd” for a court to 
enforce a contract that the law says a person must not perform.
156
 
In all the cases cited in Ledbetter, however, not one of those decisions 
ruled that the contract was unenforceable because the contract incorporated 
 
 150.  Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 at 437; see also Quatros, Inc. v. State Farm Life Ins. Co., 800 
P.2d 184, 191-93 (N.M. 1990) (construing Blaisdell). 
 151.  Sullivan Cty. Harness Racing Ass’n, v. City of Schenectady Off-Track Betting 
Comm’n, 351 N.Y.S.2d 56, 60 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973). 
 152.  Williams v. Stone, 109 F.3d 890, 896 (3d Cir. 1997) (emphasis supplied); Path to 
Health, LLP v. Long, 383 P.3d 1220, 1227 (Idaho 2016) (“Existing law becomes part of a 
contract just as though the contract contains an express provision to that effect, unless a 
contrary intent is disclosed.”) (emphasis supplied). See also SAMUEL L. WILLISTON & 
RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 30:19 (4th ed. 1999) (collecting 
cases from numerous jurisdictions). 
 153.  See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 154.  Series AGI W. Linn of Appian Group Investors DE LLC v. Eves, 158 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
193, 200 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (“‘parties may contract as they please so long as they do 
not violate the law or public policy.’”). 
 155.  15 S.W.3d 462, 464-65 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). 
 156.  Heart v. E. Tenn. Brewing Co., 113 S.W. 364, 365 (Tenn. 1908). 
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by implication the statute or policy striking down the contract.  For example, 
the Ledbetter court relied on Freeman v. Thompson,
157
 which held that an 
agreement between a life insurance salesman and the insureds was 
unenforceable as violative of Tennessee’s anti-rebate statutes.  Nowhere did 
the Freeman court say the anti-rebate statutes were contract terms in the 
illicit agreement.  Instead, the Freeman court applied the independent 
statutes as the extra-contractual standard against which the court made a 
finding of illegality. 
Courts in other jurisdictions in a similar scenario also apply the law as 
an independent standard and not as a contract term.
158
  Therefore, the 
statement can be made, if the well-entrenched public policy/illegality rule 
requires contract invalidation with laws being independent from the contract, 
then the law for purposes of contract validation should not enter the contract 
in defining the parties’ legal obligations.  Yet, courts do not require the 
implied incorporation of statutes and regulations for the public 
policy/illegality doctrine.  No cases were found addressing this discrepancy. 
III.   THE IMPLIED INCORPORATION DOCTRINE AND 
OTHER PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY AND 
CONTRACTUAL CONSTRUCTION 
A. The Differing Roles of Statutes and Contracts 
When a statute specifically or necessarily creates a contract right in a 
class of beneficiaries for inclusion in their contracts, the implied 
incorporation doctrine is sound.  However, when courts endorse the full 
breadth of the implied incorporation doctrine, they overlook that contracts 
are the acts of the parties and statutes are the acts of the legislature.  A good 
example of this questionable principle comes from a California decision: 
“Outside the contract, the statutes do not lose their identity as statutes.  It is 
like someone who has a day job and a night job.”
159
  This statement is too 
clever by half because it obscures the differing roles of contracts and statutes. 
Statutes create the relationship between the sovereign and its citizens, 
imposing public rights and obligations.  Statutes stem from the political 
process and, unless revised, are permanent statements of broad policies that 
cover as applicable all persons in that jurisdiction.  By contrast, contracts 
establish narrow economic rights and obligations between the parties and 
 
 157.  600 S.W.2d 234, 236 (Tenn. Ct. App.1979) (cited in Ledbetter, 15 S.W.3d at 464). 
 158.  See David A. Friedman, Bringing Order to Contracts Against Public Policy, 39 FLA. 
ST. U.L. REV. 563 (2012) (describing the question in-depth with no such finding). 
 159.  300 DeHaro St. Inv’rs v. Dep’t of Housing and Cmty. Dev., 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d 98, 111 
n.12 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).   
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exist for a prescribed period solely to define and facilitate the relationship in 
achieving the contractual objectives.
160
  Thus, statutes are an imperfect fit to 
be incorporated into contracts, because they generally are not devised to 
regulate commercial relationships.  The same analysis in this subsection 
regarding statutes would apply to the other legislative and executive agency 
pronouncements within the term ‘applicable laws.’ 
When a court imports a statute into a contract, the incorporation “makes 
the instrument itself express the full agreement of the parties.”
161
  Notably, 
even if the parties had inserted the missing law expressly into the contract, 
“it would not have added to the legal force and effect of the contract” because 
the implied term has equal status with an express term.
162
 
The process of transforming a statute into a contract term is not a 
mechanical or self-evident task.  When a court imports a statute into a 
contract, the process takes a statute from its legislative roots and replants it 
in contract soil.  As a result, the complication is that, “[w]hen statutory 
language is included in a contract, it assumes a new legal identity: that of 
contractual language.”
163
  The court must go through an often subtle process 
of reconfiguring the statute into the contract terms and reasonable 
disagreement could exist on the correct process in so doing.
164
  Even if the 
implied law is construed according to the legislative intent, as mandated by 
the case law,
165
 the insertion of a new material term also can have a ripple 
effect on the proper interpretation of the existing terms and can cast one or 
more of those terms in a new light as part of this integration of terms.
166
 
 
 
 
 160.  See Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. United States, 48 Fed. Cl. 785, 791 (2001) (citing 
U.S. Supreme Court decisions); Mark L. Movesian, Are Statutes Really “Legislative 
Bargains?”  The Failure of the Contract Analogy in Statutory Interpretation, 76 N.C. L. REV. 
1145, 1151 (1998) (providing similar comments). 
 161.  Wilcox v. Atkins, 213 So. 2d 879, 882 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968). 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  300 DeHaro St. Inv’rs, 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d 98 at 111.   
 164.  See Mark L. Movesian, Are Statutes Really “Legislative Bargains?”  The Failure of 
the Contract Analogy in Statutory Interpretation, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1145, 1151 (1998) (citing 
McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 
80 GEO. L.J. 705, 710-11 (1992)) (stating that statutes differ from contracts in that contracts 
reflect a bargain between two or more parties that can have conflicting interests whereas 
legislation usually results from bargaining among numerous parties having a wider diversity 
of purpose).   
 165.  See infra Part IV.F. 
 166.  See Cocke Cty. Bd. of Highway Comm’rs v. Newport Utils. Bd., 690 S.W.2d 231, 
237 (Tenn. 1985) (“It is the universal rule that a contract must be viewed from beginning to 
end and all its terms must pass in review, for one clause may modify, limit or illuminate 
another.”). 
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B. Legislative Intent to Create a Private Contractual Right and 
Remedy 
Most of the cases simply state that when courts imply a law as part of a 
contract, the analysis centers on whether the missing law is “applicable” or 
“relevant” to the contract.
167
  No case was found, however, where courts 
addressed the interplay between the implied incorporation doctrine and the 
crucial question of statutory construction — did the legislature intend the 
particular statute to reflect a private contractual right and remedy? 
When courts endow a statute as being part of a contract, they should be 
construing whether the legislative intent was to create a private contractual 
right and remedy.  Without the legislative intent to create such a right and 
remedy, “[a] ‘cause of action does not exist,’ and [courts] ‘may not create 
one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how 
compatible with the statute.’”
168
  Thus, the mere fact that the statute creates 
a right is an insufficient basis for a private party lawsuit to enforce the 
statute.
169
  The critical question of whether a statute supports a private right 
of action is if the legislature has identified individual rights and remedies for 
a described “class of beneficiaries.”
170
 
In the last several decades, the Supreme Court has throttled back on the 
lower federal courts’ ability to devise private rights from public statutes.
171
  
Under earlier decisions, the Court followed a generous pro-claimant doctrine 
that “it is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are 
 
 167.  See supra notes 27-41 and accompanying text. 
 168.  Dewakuku v. Martinez, 271 F.3d 1031, 1037-38 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (stating also that 
Congress must create private right of action to enforce federal law, which intent may be found 
explicitly or implicitly).  Some state courts have agreed with this principle.  See, e.g., Alliance 
for Metro. Stability v. Metro. Council, 671 N.W.2d 905, 916 (Minn. Ct. Ap. 2003); Somerville 
v. White, 787 S.E.2d 350, 352-53 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016) (requiring intent of state legislature to 
create a private right of action). 
 169.  Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Nat’l Energy Policy Dev. Grp., 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 33 
(D.D.C. 2002) (analyzing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286–87)(2001) and noting 
that “the statute must provide not only a private right but also a private remedy”).  In applying 
the doctrine, courts do not always determine that the statute reflects both a right and a remedy.  
See, e.g., Path to Health, 383 P.3d at 1227-28 (stating that an Idaho statute created an implied 
contractual “duty” for real estate brokers to make full disclosures to prospective clients about 
the properties to be purchased but failing to address whether the statute conferred a remedy 
on the injured party for culpable non-disclosures) (discussed in supra nn. 12-14 and 
accompanying text). 
 170.  Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002) (explaining that “benefits” are not 
the same as “rights”). See generally Mason & Dixon Lines, Inc. v. Steudle, 761 F. Supp. 2d 
6111 (E.D. Mich. 2011) (outlining a good discussion of factors). 
 171.  See Mallett v. Wis. Div. of Vocational Rehab., 130 F.3d 1245, 1249 (7th Cir. 1997) 
(stating that the Court has retreated from earlier decisions and has focused primarily on the 
legislative intent for the approach). 
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necessary to make effective the congressional purpose expressed by a 
statue.”
172
  These cases reflect the outmoded view that a court could imply a 
private right of action simply where consistent with public policy.
173
  Later 
Supreme Court decisions provide, 
[N]o legislation pursues its purposes at all costs.  Deciding what 
competing values will or will not be sacrificed to the achievement 
of a particular objective is the very essence of legislative choice – 
and it frustrates rather than effectuates the legislative intent 
simplistically to assume that whatever furthers the statute’s 
primary objective must be the law.
174
 
The current legal landscape is that “strong presumptions” exist that 
statutes “are not contractual”
175
 and generally do not authorize a private right 
of action that benefits a party.
176
  In the federal courts, a four part test governs 
whether a statute creates a cause of action either expressly or by implication; 
this analysis goes well beyond mere relevance to a cause of action or whether 
a statutory violation has harmed a plaintiff.  The factors are: 
(1) whether the plaintiff is one of a class for whose especial benefit the 
statute was enacted, i.e., whether the statute creates a right of action on behalf 
of a plaintiff; 
(2) whether there is any indication of legislative intent to create such a 
remedy or to deny one; 
(3) whether the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme allows 
such a remedy; and 
 
 172.  Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-87 (2001) (citing J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 
377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964)). 
 173.  Id. (including accompanying text). 
 174.  Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525-26 (1987) (emphasis in original). See 
also Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 833 (2002) (“Our 
task here is not to determine what would further Congress’s goal . . . but to determine what 
the words of the statute must be fairly understood to mean.”). 
 175.  See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 
451, 465–66 (1985) (stating also that “absent some clear indication that the legislature intends 
to bind itself contractually, the presumption is that ‘a law is not intended to create private 
contractual or vested rights but merely declares a policy to be pursued until the legislature 
shall ordain otherwise.’”); Chicago & A. R. Ry. Co v. Tranbarger, 238 U.S. 67, 76 (1915) 
(“[N]o person has a vested right in any general law or policy of legislation entitling him to 
insist that it shall remain unchanged for his benefit . . . .”); Studier v. Mich. Pub. Sch. Emps’ 
Retirement Bd., 698 N.W.2d 350, 361 (Mich. 2005). 
 176.  Mallett, supra note 171, at 1250 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing decisions from the First, Fifth, 
and Seventh Circuits and stating also that the maxim “expressio unius est exclusion alterius” 
can support the exclusion of implied statutory rights of action).  Under the expressio unius 
principle, “[w]hen a statute limits a thing to be done in a particular mode, it includes the 
negative of any other  mode.”  Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of R.R. Passengers, 
414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974) (quoting Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282, 289 
(1929)).   
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(4) whether the cause of action is traditionally part of state law, such 
that it would be inappropriate to create a federal cause of action based solely 
on federal law.
177
 
In this vein, the U.S. Supreme Court has said that under federal law, 
silence in a statute regarding an implied right and remedy for an aggrieved 
party is probative of the absence of such a legislative purpose.
178
 
Nevertheless, courts dealing with the implied incorporation doctrine 
routinely imply contract rights from statutes applicable to the contract with 
little or no attempt to reconcile the other competing rules of statutory 
construction.  The prevailing conservative approach restricting the creation 
of statutory contract rights cannot be reconciled with the liberal, and even 
routine, creation of contract rights under the implied incorporation doctrine.  
In a direct contradiction to the current restrictive doctrine on inferring private 
rights of action from public laws, most cases loosely indicate that absent the 
parties’ contrary intent, the implied incorporation doctrine means that every 
“applicable” or “relevant” statute creates an implied contractual duty or 
obligation and a potential right of action.
179
  In effect, where courts imply a 
contract right and remedy on the minimal showing that the law is relevant or 
applicable, they are reverting to the discarded notion that public policy alone 
may justify an implied statutory cause of action.
180
 
To implement a rational policy against over-inclusive incorporation of 
existing laws, courts should not routinely construe laws to provide a free 
standing contractual right of action or defense.  This suggestion takes on 
greater strength where the law in question creates a right and provides a 
 
 177.  Opera Plaza Residential Parcel Homeowners Ass’n v. Hoang, 376 F.3d 831, 834-35 
(9th Cir. 2004) (applying Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975)); Alaji Salahuddin v. Alaji, 232 
F.3d 305, 308-10 (2d Cir. 2000) (providing a comprehensive discussion).  State courts have 
approved the first three Cort factors regarding a state law based cause of action.  See, e.g., 
Yedidag v. Roswell Clinic Corp., 346 P.3d 1136, 1146 (N.M. 2015); Shumate v. Drake Univ., 
846 N.W.2d 503, 508 (Iowa 2014).  The second factor on legislative intent is the crucial 
component.  See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286 (noting that statutory intent is “determinative”). 
 178.  See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 571 (1979) (“[I]mplying a 
private right of action on the basis of congressional silence is a hazardous enterprise at best.”). 
 179.  See, e.g., Fowler v. State, 977 N.E.2d 464, 468 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (deeming all 
“applicable” laws as included); Inverness Vill. v. Enlow, 328 P.3d 1248, 1251 (Okla. Ct. App. 
2014) (deeming a particular “relevant” statute as being included and noting that mere silence 
in the contract does not overcome the doctrine).  Special statutes might impact this 
determination.  See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2054 (1985):  
When the parties made no provision for a particular situation, it must be assumed 
that they intended to bind themselves not only to the express provisions of the 
contract, but also to whatever the law, equity, or usage regards as implied in a 
contract of that kind or necessary for the contract to achieve its purpose.   
 180.  See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
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special, non-contractual remedy; in that event, the remedy is exclusive.
181
  
Unlike the creation of contracts, the enactment of legislation is “inherently 
subject to revision and repeal” which means that equating the contracting 
process with the legislative process could “limit drastically” the essential 
powers of a legislature.
182
 
Such a view would “ill-advised[ly]” bind the hands of future legislative 
sessions and impair the ability to repeal or even revise the statute in the 
public interest.
183
  State and federal legislatures are fully capable of including 
terms in a statute that confer rights on private contracting parties,
184 and the 
courts should not get ahead of the legislature by enforcing a perceived public 
policy effect of a statute without a clear legislative imprimatur. 
C. Undue Reliance on Legal Fictions 
Implied terms in contracts are a common legal fiction.
185
  Discerning 
courts and commentators have observed that courts have piled one fiction 
(every person knows the law) upon another fiction (parties intend to adopt 
all applicable laws in their contract).
186
  Further, a third fiction could just as 
easily be added (parties understand all their obligations in the contract).
187
  
Citing an earlier version of the Williston treatise, the Texas Court of Appeals 
has shown why this layering of fictions is inappropriate: 
 
 181.  See Ky. v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 445, 459-60 (2004) (citing United States v. 
Babcock, 250 U.S. 328, 331 (1919)). See also Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 
444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979) (“[I]t is an elemental canon of statutory construction that where a 
statute expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading 
others into it.”). 
 182.  Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., supra note 176, at 465-66. 
 183.  N.C. Ass’n of Educators, Inc. v. State, 786 S.E.2d 255, 262-63 (N.C. 2016).  
Although the government is precluded from entering a binding agreement that it will not 
exercise sovereign power, it can agree contractually that if it does so, the government will pay 
the private party damages for a breach.  Amino Bros. Co. v. United States, 372 F.2d 485, 491 
(Ct. Cl. 1967), cited in United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 881-82 (1996). 
 184.  See, e.g., Walls v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 276 F.3d 502, 508-09 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(“Congress certainly knows how to create a private right of action when it wants to[.]”). 
 185.  Seaton v. State, 998 P.2d 131, 136 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000). 
 186.  Kierstad v. City of San Antonio, 636 S.W.2d 522, 528 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982), rev’d 
on other grounds, 643 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. 1982) (quoting 4 SAMUEL L. WILLISTON, WILLISON 
ON CONTRACTS § 615, at 605-06 (3d ed. 1961)). See also T & S Distribs., L.L.C. v. Mich. Bell 
Tel. Co., 2008 WL 724084 at *9  (Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (citing 11 SAMUEL L. WILLISTON & 
RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 30:21 (4th ed. 1999)); Fed. Land 
Bank of Omaha v. Houck, 4 N..W.2d 213 (S.D. 1942) (citing 4 SAMUEL L. WILLISTON, 
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 615 at 605-06 (3d ed. 1961)). 
 187.  See McQuiddy Printing Co. v. Hirsig, 134 S.W.2d 204, 204 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1939) 
(“parties conclusively [are] presumed to understand their contractual obligations and evidence 
is inadmissible to show their understanding to have been otherwise”). 
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[Williston] points out that to assume that every contracting party 
knows the law of the state where the contract is made and of the 
state where it is to be performed and then to assume that each 
contracting party adopts the provisions of such laws as part of his 
contract “is, indeed, to pile a fiction upon a fiction, and certainly 
without any necessity, for where different conclusions are reached 
by means of the fiction than would be reached without it, they are 
not preferable to the opposite ones.”
188
 
Notwithstanding this cogent criticism, courts have ignored the 
prevailing rule that a presumption cannot be based on another presumption 
to support the outcome of the case.
189
  The reason is the “prohibition against 
[juries] piling inference upon inference indicates that at some point along a 
rational continuum, inferences may become so attenuated from underlying 
evidence as to cast doubt on the trier of fact’s ultimate conclusion.”
190
 
Courts should revisit the concept that a legal fiction, properly applied, 
“is always consistent with equity.”
191
  Professor Lon Fuller cites with 
disapproval the cynical definition of a fiction as being “a device for attaining 
desired legal consequences or avoiding undesired legal consequences.”
192
  
This Article has shown that the implied incorporation doctrine can be 
inequitable to promisors and detrimental to stable commercial 
relationships.
193
  Because courts have unduly resorted to the dubious practice 
of pyramiding of legal fictions to achieve a supposedly desired legal 
outcome, this heavy reliance on legal fictions shows that the implied 
incorporation doctrine is an under-theorized and ultimately invalid precept 
of contract law.
194
 
 
 188.  See supra note 186. See generally W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Modern Status of the 
Rules Against Basing an Inference Upon an Inference or a Presumption Upon a Presumption, 
5 A.L.R. 3d 100 (1966 & Supp.) (echoing the principle that case law generally disfavors 
basing presumptions on presumptions to support an outcome in a case). 
 189.  United States v. Ross, 92 U.S. 281, 283 (1875). 
 190.  Cf. United States v. Michel, 446 F.3d 1122, 1127-28 (10th Cir. 2006) (outlining rule 
in criminal cases). 
 191.  United States v. Coward, 151 F. Supp. 2d 544, 550 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (citing BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 778 (6th ed. 1990)). 
 192.  Id. (citing Lon L.  Fuller, Legal Fictions, 25 ILL. L. REV. 323, 331 (1930) (quoting 
Oliver R. Mitchell, The Fictions of Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 249, 253 (1893)). 
 193.  See supra note 77-80 and accompanying text. 
 194.  The theoretical weaknesses of legal fictions are well-documented.  See, e.g., LON L. 
FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS viii (1967) (“[Legal] fiction[s] represent[ ] the pathology of the 
law.”); id. (“[W]e may liken the [legal] fiction to an awkward patch applied to a rent in the 
law’s fabric of theory.”). 
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D. Default Principle or Immutable Rule? 
By definition a “default” rule is one that the parties can contract around 
by prior agreement and an “immutable rule” is one that “parties cannot 
change by contractual agreement.”
195
  Again, the case law is marked by 
conflicting decisions on this crucial element of the implied incorporation 
doctrine. 
The majority rule is that courts allow an opt out provision to the implied 
incorporation principle:  “It is well established that ‘unless the contract 
provides otherwise, all applicable law in force at the time the agreement is 
made implicitly forms a part of the agreement without any statement to that 
effect.’”
196
  Therefore, when they opt out of the implied incorporation 
doctrine, the parties under many decisions will not be bound by applicable 
laws as being terms of the agreement.
197
 
Another line of decisions, rarely if ever acknowledged by cases 
following the majority rule, prohibits an opt-out contract term under all 
circumstances.  Thus a leading Rhode Island Supreme Court decision holds, 
“[t]he statute is as much a part of the contract . . . even though the parties 
knew nothing of the statute and did not include the provision or even though 
they knew of the legislation and expressly agreed upon the exact 
contrary.”
198
  Some states even go so far to follow both lines of precedent 
without comment on the split of authority.
199
  No cases were found 
addressing the discrepant opinions, and some decisions deny that any 
disagreement exists on this point.
200
 
This division of authority raises the issue of whether the implied 
 
 195.  See infra notes 206-11 and accompanying text. 
 196.  See, e.g., Geller v. Kinney, 980 N.E.2d 390, 397 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (emphasis 
supplied). See also Metro. Sports Facilities Comm’n v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 460 N.W.2d 625, 629 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (“[A]bsent any contrary indication, the laws in existence at the time a 
contract is executed are presumed by the parties to be part of the contract.”); In re Estate of 
Peterson, 381 N.W.2d 109, 116 (Neb. 1986) (“‘[E]xisting statutes . . . at the time a contract is 
made becomes a part of it and must be read into it just as if an express provision to that effect 
were inserted therein, except when the contract discloses a different intention.’”). 
 197.  S&D Serv., Inc. v. 915-925 W. Schubert Condo. Ass’n, 478 N.E.2d 478, 483 (Ill. Ct. 
App. 1985).  The analysis here is similar to the analysis on parallel contractual and statutory 
enforcement.  See infra Part IV.G. 
 198.  Sterling Eng’g & Const. Co. v. Town of Burrville Hous. Auth., 279 A.2d 445, 447 
(R.I. 1971) (emphasis supplied) (citations omitted). 
 199.  Compare Dolman v. U.S. Tr. Co., 138 N.E.2d 784, 787 (N.Y. 1956) (following 
majority rule) with In Re Estate of Havemeyer, 217 N.E.2d 26, 27 (N.Y. 1966) (following 
minority rule).  The Rhode Island Supreme Court so construed the Havemeyer decision as 
following the minority rule.  See Sterling, 279 A.2d at 726. 
 200.  See United States v. Essley, 284 F.2d 518, 520 (10th Cir. 1960) (noting that the 
authorities “are in agreement” that parties can follow a contrary intention about the implied 
incorporation doctrine).  
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incorporation rule is properly a “default” rule, i.e., a gap filler, or an 
“immutable” rule, i.e., a mandatory rule.  Professor Randy Barnett has 
explained the quoted concepts: 
[D]efault rules are binding in the absence of manifested assent to 
the contrary—which means that a manifested assent to the contrary 
will displace the default rule.  Any gap-filling rule that cannot be 
displaced by manifested assent is not properly called a default rule 
at all, but is what [commentators] have called an “immutable” 
rule—that is, some other kind of contract law background norm 
that may fill a gap in assent or may even displace the manifested 
assent of the parties.
201
 
Applying the above default rule/immutable rule distinction, the great 
majority of jurisdictions in effect hold that the doctrine is a default rule 
because of the opt out provision.  A “default” rule, as stated above, allows 
the parties to decide whether they wish to exclude terms (here, existing laws) 
that would otherwise be included in the agreement.
202
  As indicated by the 
Indiana Court of Appeals, courts follow this default approach based on the 
freedom of contract:  “If the parties may, by their conversation and private 
understanding, make and include as part of their contract a future statute, 
why may they not, by their private understanding and agreement, exclude 
from the operation of their contract an existing statute?”
203
 
Classifying the rule as a default principle has some prominent 
supporters.  Writing for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 
Judge Richard Posner said that “sometimes” the implied incorporation 
principle is a “legal fiction” but that it has value in serving as an “off the 
rack” economizing default principle.
204
  Similarly, Professor Allan 
Farnsworth calls the implied incorporation doctrine an “off the rack” default 
principle.
205
  By this usage, Posner and Farnsworth believe that where parties 
 
 201.  Randy E. Barnett, The Sounds of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 
78 VA. L. REV. 821, 825 (1992). See also Heaton-Sides v. Snipes, 755 S.E.2d 648, 651 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 2014) (“In contract law there are generally two types of rules: default rules and 
immutable rules.  Default rules are rules that “parties can contract around by prior agreement. 
Immutable rules, by comparison, are those rules that “parties cannot change by contractual 
agreement.”).  The U.C.C. itself is largely a set of default rules that fill gaps left by the parties 
in described circumstances.  Sundram Fasteners Ltd. v. Flexitech, Inc., No. 08-CV-13103, 
2009 WL 2351763, at *6 (E.D. Mich. July 29, 2008).  Some examples are the parties agree 
to: (1) a “reasonable price” if the price term is left open (U.C.C. § 2-305); (2) “best efforts” 
in exclusive dealing contracts unless otherwise agreed (U.C.C. § 2-307); and (3) delivery at 
the seller’s place of business unless otherwise agreed (U.C.C. 2-308). 
 202.  See McMahon v. Chi. Mercantile Exch., 582 N.E.2d 1313, 11319 (Ill. Ct. App. 
1991).  See also supra note 201 and cases cited.  
 203.  Mouch v. Ind. Rolling Mill Co., 151 N.E. 137, 139 (Ind. Ct. App. 1926) (en banc). 
 204.  Selcke v. New England Ins. Co., 995 F.2d 688, 690 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 205. 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 7.16, at 352 (3d ed. 2004). 
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are in a recurring fact pattern, and where the legal principle accords with the 
expectation of the parties, the parties may rely on the doctrine by implication 
in making their agreement.
206
 
The better view is that this judicial device for supplementing the 
contract is a mandatory or immutable rule.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decisions indicate support for the immutable version.  In construing the 
relation of the Constitution’s Contract Clause and an amended statute that 
impaired pre-existing implied statutory rights, the Court stated in General 
Motors Corp. v. Romein, “[f]or the most part, state laws are implied into 
private contracts regardless of the assent of the parties . . . when those laws 
affect the validity, construction, and enforcement of contracts.”
207
  Notably, 
no case was found where the Court expressly endorsed or mentioned the 
version of the implied incorporation doctrine that allows opt out provisions.  
Furthermore, valid required clauses are a mandatory part of the contract even 
if omitted or if the parties agree otherwise in federal public contracts 
involving federal statutory obligations and their implementing regulations.
208
 
The choice is clear that the doctrine is an immutable rule (as under the 
minority view) because each premise of the implied incorporation doctrine 
is itself mandatory.  As for those elements, the cases recognize that every 
person is conclusively presumed to know the law,
209
 the doctrine is a 
mandatory implied term,
210
 and parties cannot abrogate existing law.
211
  If all 
the elements are mandatory then the only logical conclusion is that the 
doctrine itself is mandatory but with one qualification —where the statute 
itself says parties can vary the effect of the statute by agreement.  The best 
example in this second category comes from the U.C.C., which states that 
with very few exceptions, such as the non-waivable rule of good faith and 
fair dealing, parties may waive or modify nearly all of the U.C.C. default 
rules.
212
  Otherwise, where courts accept the premises of the implied 
incorporation doctrine, they should deem it an immutable principle unless 
 
 206.  Id.; see also Moreau v. Harris Cty., 158 F.3d 241, 247 (5th Cir. 1998) (“In many 
situations, an ‘untailored default,’ a ‘single, off-the-rack standard’ that provides a satisfactory 
contractual solution in the run of cases may be preferable” to tailoring a default just for the 
parties at hand).   
 207.  503 U.S. at 189 (emphasis supplied). 
 208.  See United States v. Bills, 822 F.2d 373, 377 (3d Cir. 1987) (citing G.L. Christian & 
Assoc. v. United States, 320 F.2d 345 (Ct. Cl. 1963)) (analyzed in Part V). 
 209.  See supra Part III.A.1. 
 210.  See supra Part III.A.2. 
 211.  Prof’l Prop. Servs., Inc. v. Agler Green Townhouses, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 831, 833 
(S.D. Ohio 1998) (citing Ohio decisions). See also Paradissiotis v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 
16, 20 (2001) (explaining how a contract will not defeat a lawfully promulgated statute or 
regulation). 
 212.  See U.C.C. § 1-301 (stating general rule that parties may waive most U.C.C. rules 
by agreement). 
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the legislature permits otherwise. 
E. Choice of Law and Conflict of Laws 
Under the implied incorporation doctrine, parties are also bound by the 
principles associated with choice of law.
213
  Citing the area of conflict of 
laws, Corbin noted how the implied incorporation doctrine is a poor fit for 
understanding a contract: 
Very difficult problems in the conflict of laws arise, so that the 
most learned of jurists do not agree as to the law which should be 
applied.  In choosing the applicable law and in determining the 
results of its application, the court is always doing much more than 
mere interpretation of the terms of the contract.
214
 
Where the contract lacks a valid choice of law provision for deciding 
which state’s substantive law shall govern, American jurisdictions are 
divided on the proper approach to choice of law.  Some states follow the rule 
of “lex loci contractus” — 
[T]he validity, nature, construction, and interpretation of a contract 
are governed by the substantive law of the state where the contract 
was made, except that where the contract is made in one state and 
is to be performed in another state, the substantive law of the state 
where the contract is performed will apply.
215
 
By contrast, most states follow the multi-factor balancing test of the 
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts.
216
  When courts as a matter of the parties’ 
purported intent determine the choice of law and bind a party from one state 
to the laws and decisions of another state, the case law stretches the implied 
incorporation legal fiction to the breaking point.  The ordinary person lacks 
this knowledge and would likely consider it a waste of time to acquire it. 
Another logical consequence of the doctrine is the resolution of another 
choice of law problem, viz., conflicts between federal and state laws on the 
same subject matter.  Under the U.S. Constitution’s Supremacy clause, 
 
 213.  Dick Broad. Co., Inc. v. Oak Ridge FM Inc., 395 S.W3 653, 668-69 (Tenn. 2013). 
 214.  3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 551 at 198 (rev ed. 1960). 
 215.  E.g., Fed. Ins. Co. v. Nat’l Distrib. Co., 417 S.E.2d 671, 673 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) 
(endorsing lex loci contractus). 
 216.  E.g., Shannon-Vail Five Inc. v. Bunch, 270 F.3d 1207, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(endorsing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS). See also  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1971) (providing that the rights and duties of the parties with 
respect to an issue in contract are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect 
to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties under the 
principles stated in § 6 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS). For additional 
discussion of choice of law and the implied incorporation doctrine, see 17A C.J.S. Contracts 
§ 348 (2012).   
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applicable federal laws and regulations override or displace conflicting state 
laws,
217
 especially where the subject matter of the contract relates to a federal 
issue where Congress has enacted all-encompassing legislation.
218
  Yet other 
potential (but supportable) choice of law applications are that the parties 
necessarily incorporate relevant treaties and international law concepts 
because treaties and the law of nations are part of domestic law and have the 
status of federal law.
219
  While the cases have yet to address these other 
ramifications of the implied incorporation doctrine, these other applications 
are certainly available for use by the parties and the courts. 
As Corbin observed about the rules regarding of choice of law, “The 
parties themselves seldom say, or even think, anything about the matter.”
220
  
The problem of choice of law and the implied incorporation doctrine thereby 
illustrates just how far courts are willing to go to uphold public policy 
choices at the expense of seeking the parties’ intent on these matters. 
F. Rule of Interpretation or Construction? 
A confounding issue for the implied incorporation doctrine is whether 
it is a rule of construction or interpretation (and sometimes cases intermix 
the two concepts in the same opinion).  “Contract interpretation” ascertains 
the factual meaning of the words in the contract whereas “contract 
construction” refers to the legal operation and effect of the contract regarding 
the unexpressed implications.
221
  An example of contract construction would 
be that covenants not to compete as between employers and employees are 
strictly construed against the employer to avoid undue restrictions on the 
former employee’s ability to pursue an occupation.
222
  An example of 
 
 217.  See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372-73 (2000) (stating 
that Congress has authority to pre-empt, or displace, state law, expressly or impliedly); Fid. 
Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 157 (1982) (discussing federal pre-
emption).  
 218.  Cornick v. Sw. Iowa Broad. Co., 107 N.W.2d 920, 921-22 (Iowa 1991). 
 219.  See Fidelity Federal Sav. and Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 157 (1982) 
(noting the incorporation of all federal law into the laws of each individual state). See also 
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 2739, 2764 (2004) (describing how international law is 
part of domestic law); Kane v. Winn, 319 F. Supp. 2d 162, 196 (D. Mass. 2004) (providing a 
relevant discussion of treaties). 
 220.  3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 551 at 198 n.34 (rev ed. 1960). 
 221.  Ram Const. Co., Inc. v. Am. State Ins. Co., 749 F.2d 1049, 1053 (3d Cir. 1984) 
(engaging in extensive relevant discussion); Peak v. Adams, 799 N.W.2d 535, 543 (Iowa 
2011); Rios v. Jennie-O Turkey Store, Inc., 793 N.W.2d 309, 316 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011) 
(citing Deerhurst, 165 A.2d at 552-53); In re A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 197 B.R. 590, 595 (Bankr.  
E.D. Va. 1994); 3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 551 at 200 (rev. ed. 1960). 
 222.  See Rental Unif. Serv. of Florence, Inc. v. Dudley, 301 S.E.2d 142, 143 (S.C. 1983)  
(“Restrictive covenants not to compete are generally disfavored and will be strictly construed 
against the employer.”). 
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contract interpretation would be whether the simple reference to a “motor 
vehicle” in an insurance policy would include a motorcycle.
223
 
Corbin reasoned that the implied incorporation principle goes to the 
“legal operation of a contract, [and is] not one that affects factual 
interpretation.”
224
  For example, Corbin said that when state legislatures 
enact a law that a specific provision be included in a contract, this statute is 
a rule of construction because it prescribes the legal operation of the contract 
and not the factual interpretation of its terms.  Therefore, under the Corbin 
view, it will be the legislature’s intent and not the parties’ intent that will 
govern contractual construction on the imputed statutes.
225
 
Adhering to the notion that interpretation and construction differ 
significantly, Corbin strongly criticized those courts classifying the implied 
incorporation rule as a matter of contract interpretation.  Applying the 
traditional understanding, Corbin said the implied incorporation principle 
“cannot be accepted as correct,” because the implied use of statutes and rules 
of law “is not a rule of [contract] interpretation” and “are certainly not 
incorporated into the contract.”
226
 
A New Jersey court accurately indicated that Williston and Corbin are 
essentially in the same camp on this issue.
227
  Corbin skillfully showed how 
the issue does not pertain to the meaning of the individual words.  Williston’s 
major contribution was his “incisive argument [that] successfully exploded 
the notion that rules of law are always to be considered a part of the contract 
 
 223.  Moore v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 40 S.W.2d 403, 403 (Tenn. 1931). 
 224.  3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 551 at 200 (rev. ed. 1960). 
 225.  Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 cmt. a. (1981) (“The 
supplying of an omitted term is not technically interpretation[.]”); Ram Constr. Co., 749 F.3d 
at 1053 (“Construction, which may be usefully distinguished from interpretation, is a process 
by which legal consequences are made to follow from the terms of the contract and its more 
or less immediate context, and from a legal policy or policies that are applicable to the 
situation.”); Rios v. Jennie-O Turkey Store, Inc., 793 N.W.2d 309, 316 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011) 
(explaining that doctrine is one of contract construction and not interpretation).  
 226.  See 3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 551 at 197-98, 200 (rev. ed. 
1960) (indicating that confusion may be understandable because “[t]he processes of 
interpretation [and construction] are almost always carried on together.”). 
 227.  See Deerhurst Estates, 165 A.2d at 552-53 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1960) (citing the Corbin 
and Williston treatises).  Actually, Williston was more equivocal than Corbin on this issue.  
In an earlier edition of his treatise, Williston wrote, “[d]oubtless, law frequently is adopted by 
the parties as a portion of their agreement.  [Whether it is in] any particular case should be 
determined by the same standard of interpretation as is applied to their expressions in other 
respects.”  Caroline N. Brown, North Carolina Common Law Parol Evidence Rule, 87 N.C. 
L. Rev. 1699, 1737 (2009) (emphasis supplied) (citing 2 Samuel L. Williston, WILLISTON ON 
CONTRACTS § 615, at 605-06 (3d ed. 1961).  Thus, whether he meant it or not, by using the 
term “interpretation” Williston undermined his own idea that the doctrine is a principle of 
construction. 
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of the parties based on their presumed intention to include them.”
228
 
As was true in Corbin and Williston’s day, however, some modern day 
courts apparently still (incorrectly) characterize the implied incorporation 
doctrine as a rule of “contract interpretation.”
229
  The word “apparently” is 
used advisedly because the same decision will sometimes intermix the term 
“construction” with “interpretation” or “the intention of the parties” and it 
can be difficult to tell whether courts are using the terms synonymously or 
in their traditional sense.
230
  In fact, some authorities declare the distinction 
between interpretation and construction is too abstract or lacks value, but 
commentators have persuasively argued the difference is “workable and 
useful.”
231
 
The case law bears out the soundness of the Corbin/Williston position 
on whether the rule is a matter of statutory construction or contract 
interpretation.  As the Ninth Circuit has commented, “Statutory intent . . . is 
more relevant to the interpretation of these conditions than are common law 
contract principles.”
232
  Similarly, the Ohio Supreme Court has long 
recognized, “[t]he liability thus created is obviously, therefore, not a 
contractual liability involving a meeting of the minds, but a purely statutory 
obligation.”
233
  Along the same lines, the Federal Circuit has observed that 
 
 228.  See Brown, supra note 227, at 1737 (quoting James H. Chadbourn & Charles T. 
McCormick, The Parol Evidence Rule in North Carolina, 9 N.C. L. REV. 151, 166 (1931)).  
One issue that cuts across the contract interpretation/statutory construction divide is the 
applicability of the parol evidence rule, i.e., the principle excluding the admissibility of 
extrinsic evidence to supplement or contradict terms of a complete and unambiguous contract, 
absent exceptional circumstances such as ambiguity, fraud or mistake.  See Harris v. Allstate 
Ins. Co., 300 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2002) (stating this rule); Berg v. Hudesman, 801 P.2d 222, 
229 (Wash. 1990) (stating this rule); Deerhurst, 165 A.2d at 152-53 (stating this rule).  If one 
accepts the premise that the implied incorporation doctrine is an issue of contract construction 
rather than contract interpretation, then it would be clear that the parol evidence rule does not 
exclude contract terms supplied by law.  Ervco v. Texaco Refining and Mktg., Inc., 422 F. 
Supp. 2d 1084, 1087-88 (D. Ariz. 2006) (explaining that the process of construing contracts 
means that the parol evidence rule does not preclude references to statutes included by 
reference); Helen Hadjiyannakis, The Parol Evidence Rule and Implied Terms: The Sounds 
of Silence, 54 Fordham L. Rev. 35, 44 (1985) (noting that “authorities agree that the parol 
evidence rule does not exclude obligations imposed by law.”).   
 229.  See, e.g., Ohio, Pa. & W. Va. Coal Co. v. PanEnergy Corp., 120 F.3d 607, 610-11 
(6th Cir. 2007) (applying incorrectly the concept of implied incorporation); Unihealth v. U.S. 
Healthcare, Inc. 14 F. Supp. 2d 623, 633 (D.N.J. 1998) (applying incorrectly the concept of 
implied incorporation). 
 230.  E.g., Morrell v. Wellstar Health System, Inc., 633 S.E.2d 68, 71 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) 
(“The cardinal rule of contract construction is to ascertain the intention of the parties. . . .”).  
 231.  See Edwin W. Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64 
COLUM. L. REV. 833, 837 (1964). 
 232.  Rendleman v. Brown, 860 F.2d 1537, 1541-42 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 233.  Lloyd v. Cincinnati Checker Cab Co., 36 N.E.2d 67, 69 (Ohio 1941).  Corbin cites 
the Lloyd case for the proposition that when the legislature prescribes the use of a contract 
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“[w]here a contract implements or fulfills a statutory requirement, the 
interpretation of the contract will be guided by the underlying statute.”
234
  
Parallel rules state that courts construe regulations in contracts to effectuate 
the intent of the regulators and not the parties.
235
 
Another way of looking at this issue is to assess the reasonable 
expectations flowing from the implied incorporation of laws and regulations.  
When the contracting parties are bound by a statute, they agree to comply 
with the law as envisioned by the legislature as a matter of statutory 
construction and not as the parties might have (mis)understood it.
236
  By 
comparison, the primary function of contract interpretation is to do the 
opposite and enforce the “reasonable expectations of the parties” as 
expressed at the time of contract formation.
237
  Thus, what counts for the 
implied incorporation doctrine is not discerning the reasonable expectation 
of the parties but identifying, to the extent possible, the reasonable 
expectations of the legislature.  In the words of the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit,
238
 
We recognize that in construing a contract which rests upon statute, the 
statute must be read into the contract, and that rules for construing statutes 
are not those which apply to the construction of contracts.  Whereas in a 
 
provision, the legislature’s intention controls irrespective of how the contractors understood 
it or even if the parties agree to the contrary.  3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 
§ 551 at 197, 200 (rev. ed. 1960). See also Kolbe v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 738 
F.3d 432, 443 (1st Cir. 2013) (describing the same).   
 234.  Dalles Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 346, 355 (2008). See also Gaudet 
v. Safeco Ins. Co., 593 A.2d 1362, 1365 (Conn. 1991) (noting that where the legislature has 
dictated the inclusion of terms in a contract, it is appropriate to consider the legislative intent 
to interpret those terms). 
 235.  Honeywell Inc. v. United States, 661 F.2d 182, 186 (Ct. Cl. 1982).   
 236.  Kolbe, 738 F.3d at 442 (Lynch, C.J., separate opinion) (citing 5 MARGARET N. 
KNIFFIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.26 at 278 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 1998); Ramos 
v. SimplexGrinnell LP, 21 N.E.3d 237, 239 (N.Y. 2014). 
 237.  See Spear, Leeds & Kellogg v. Cent. Life Assurance Co., 85 F.3d 21, 28 (2d Cir. 
1996) (reasoning that courts ascertain and implement the reasonable expectations of the 
parties who undertake to be bound by its provisions); Norville v. Carr-Gottstein Foods Co., 
84 P.3d 996, 1004 (Alaska 2004) (finding also that courts use the parties’ expectations when 
considering a contract).  Some courts take a third course and state that the parties’ reasonable 
expectation is that courts will enforce the relevant laws and regulations based on the 
lawgiver’s intent as part of the agreement.  E.g., Madison Ave. Leasehold, LLC v. Madison 
Bentley Assocs. LLC, 811 N.Y.S.2d 47, 53 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (ruling that “[w]ith respect 
to reasonable expectations, it is axiomatic that the parties to an agreement will interpret the 
instrument governing their relationship in accordance with existing law . . . .”).  Cf. B.F. 
Goodrich Co. v. United States, 94 F.3d 1545, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (stating that, as a court, 
“we are unaware of any authority or rule of statutory construction which would permit us to 
give effect to [a party’s] ‘reasonable expectations,’ in contravention of statutory language.”). 
 238.  Pers. Indus. Bankers v. Citizens Budget Co. of Dayton, Ohio, 80 F.2d 327, 328 (6th 
Cir. 1935) (citation omitted). 
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contract the intention of the parties may be the controlling element, and their 
own acts may give meaning to their words, in interpreting statutes ‘the only 
intent which judicial construction can make certain is the intent of the 
legislative power.’
239
 
G. Parallel Contractual and Statutory Enforcement 
When courts imply statutes as contract terms, the judges similarly 
should import the full catalog of statutory canons of construction.  Thus, the 
Virginia Court of Appeals has stated that: 
[W]hen a court must determine whether something is embraced 
within the terms of a statute, the statute should be construed ‘with 
reference to its subject matter, and the object sought to be obtained, 
as well as the legislative purpose in enacting it; and its language 
should receive that construction which will render it harmonious 
with that purpose rather than that which will defeat it.’
240
 
A similar conclusion applies to the other categories of “laws” for 
purposes of this Article. 
Despite all the cases construing the implied incorporation doctrine, and 
the asserted rationale that it is essential for the stability and certainty of 
contracting relationships, the argument can be made that the entire doctrine 
is superfluous and adds very little to the body of contract law.  Statutes exert 
their full authority over all citizens, irrespective of whether the laws are 
included in contracts; statutes with their independent force and effect do not 
need the protection of the implied incorporation doctrine.  Regardless of their 
intent or convenience, private parties may not agree to alter duties imposed 
by the legislature.
241
  Whether the parties have contracted subject to the 
general law does not mean that courts will excuse them from being subject 
to a relevant law when the court construes the contract in light of the 
 
 239.  But see supra note 237 (indicating the reasonable expectation of the parties is to 
enforce the reasonable expectations of the legislature).  
 240.  Esparza v. Commonwealth, 513 S.E.2d 885, 888 (Va. Ct. App. 1999) (citations 
omitted).  
 241.  Connolly v. Pension Ben. Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 224 (1986) (ruling no reputable 
court will use its authority to approve an illegal contract). See also Thrifty Oil Co. v. Bank of 
Am, Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Ass’n, 322 F.3d 1039, 1059 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the 
applicability of relevant laws to contract is not a matter of the enforceability of the contract 
but of statutory construction).  At least one court has held (incorrectly) that it should avoid 
the legislature’s intent.  See Farouki v. Petra Int’l Banking Corp., 63 F. Supp. 3d 84, 88 
(D.D.C. 2014), aff’d, 608 Fed. Appx. 8 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (ruling that where the 
case involves only the individual rights of private parties, “‘a court ought to struggle greatly 
to avoid a construction of the law which would affect the rights of the parties.’”). 
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statute.
242
 
Indeed, “‘[i]t is elementary that no valid contract may be made contrary 
to statute . . .’”
243
 which principle finds expression in the equitable maxim, 
privatorum conventio juri public non derogat (the agreements of private 
individuals will not be allowed to operate as to diminish the effect of a public 
law).
244
  As Corbin observes, irrespective of whether the parties include a 
statute in a contract, they are bound to the law even if ignorant of the law or 
whether they know it and expressly agree to the contrary.
245
  Simply put, 
entering a contract is not a safe harbor to violate the law. 
Despite the rule that contracts cannot override laws, most authorities 
have seemingly ignored this rule and hold that parties have the ability to 
express a contrary intention that the parties are not bound by relevant 
statutory requirements.  A common statement is “parties to a contract are 
presumed to [be] mindful of the existing law and that all applicable or 
relevant laws must be read into the agreement . . . except where a contrary 
intention is evident.”
246
  Literally construed, parties by contract may decide 
when a party is exempt from the law.  Importantly, these cases hold to the 
doctrine even when no evidence exists in the court’s opinion that a party 
made a valid waiver of her statutory or regulatory rights.
247
  These holdings 
without any satisfactory explanation directly contradict Corbin’s above 
argument and conclusion that parties remain bound by the law.
248
  Therefore, 
the rules allowing parties contractual exemptions from the law should be 
reconstituted as suggested above. 
 
 242.  11 SAMUEL L. WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS § 30:24 (4th ed. 1999) (stating that parties can exempt themselves from the 
operation of the law only where the law does not safeguard the public good or morals and 
where the renunciation does not affect the rights of others). 
 243.  Agler Green Townhouses, Inc., 998 F. Supp. at 833 (citing Ohio decisions). See also 
Paradissiotis v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 16, 21 (2001) (stating that a contract will not defeat 
a lawfully promulgated statute or regulation). 
 244.  Cary, 675 S.W.2d at 493. 
 245.  3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 551 at 201 (rev. ed. 1960). 
 246.  See Williams v. Stone, 109 F.3d 890, 896 (3d Cir. 1997) (applying Maryland law); 
Halderman by Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 901 F.2d 311, 323 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(applying Pennsylvania law); McMahon v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 582 N.E.2d 1313, 
1319 (Ill. Ct. App. 1991) (applying Illinois law); 11 SAMUEL L. WILLISTON & RICHARD A. 
LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 30:19 (4th ed. 1999) (citing cases).  
 247.  See supra notes 197-98 (including cases cited therein). 
 248.  See also Kandra v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1201 (D. Or. 2001) (finding 
that a party’s contract rights are subservient to applicable statutes).  The analysis in this section 
parallels whether the rule is a default or immutable rule.  See supra Part IV, D. 
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H. Other Canons of Contractual Construction 
The prior section mentioned waiver of statutory/regulatory rights in a 
contract.  No doubt exists that parties generally may waive statutory rights 
in a contract where intended for their benefit, provided that the waiver “is 
clear and unmistakable” and there is no contrary legislative intent barring a 
waiver.
249
  Where a valid waiver occurs, the particular laws are no longer 
part of the particular party’s contract.
250
  Indeed, waiver could override much 
of the implied incorporation doctrine. 
Some cases give the impression that waiver of applicable laws is never 
permissible; for example, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has said that the 
implied incorporation doctrine applies “even though they knew of the 
legislation and expressly agreed upon the exact contrary.”
251
  Curbing this 
right of waiver by mandating the inclusion of a statute/regulation in a 
contract irrespective of the party’s desires to the contrary does not well-serve 
the commercial law system.  For one, long standing precedent allows a party 
to a contract to waive a constitutional or statutory right or even to change an 
established rule of law.
252
  If courts allow parties to waive constitutional 
rights, surely it is proper for a party to waive a lesser right of 
statutory/regulatory construction.  No one could argue that such a waiver 
eradicates the general binding force of the Constitution or duly enacted laws 
and regulations.  This right of waiver is at least equal to the rule approving 
the implied incorporation doctrine.  In fact, undue restrictions on 
statutory/regulatory waiver can adversely impact the strong public policy of 
a party’s right of freedom of contract – which enjoys constitutional 
protection – with no corresponding systemic benefits.
253
 
As indicated above, a legislature may make a policy choice forbidding 
waiver of statutory rights where necessary to preserve congressional 
intent.
254
  In this class of statutes, even where a party expressly purports to 
 
 249.  Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 80 (1992); Reservation Ranch v. 
United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 696, 711 (1997), aff’d, 217 F.3d 850 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Selzer v. 
Baker, 65 N.E.2d 752, 753 (N.Y. 1946).  
 250.  Cycle Dealers Ins., Inc. v. Bankers Ins. Co., 394 So. 2d 1123. 1124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1981). 
 251.  Sterling Eng’g & Const. Co. v. Town of Burrillville Hous. Auth., 279 A.2d 445, 447 
(R.I. 1971) (citing decisions). 
 252.  Wilkes v. Allegan Fruit & Produce Co., 206 N.W. 483, 484 (Mich. 1925). 
 253.  Cf. Ballsteadt v. Amoco Oil Co., 509 F. Supp. 1095, 1096 (N.D. Iowa 1981) (noting 
that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects freedom of contract, which is a 
“matter of great public concern”); E. Cent. Okla. Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Co., 469 
P.2d 662, 664 (Okla. 1970) (reasoning that “[i]t is well settled that freedom to contract, or the 
right to enter a contract, is protected from arbitrary restraint or interference by the due process 
clauses of [the] state and federal constitutions.”). 
 254.  Reservation Ranch v. United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 696, 711 (1997) (citing U.S. 
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waive a statute applicable to a contract, but the statute affects the public 
interest or the institutional concerns of the legislature, the waiver will be 
ineffective.
255
  An example is that in the federal procurement system, a party 
may not waive the rights established in the Contract Disputes Act
256
 for the 
resolution of contract disputes between the United States and its 
contractors.
257
  Another example is that a worker protected by the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (which covers such matters as the federal minimum wage, 
overtime compensation, and safe working conditions) cannot waive its 
protections.
258
 
The problem with the above canon barring waiver is the difficulty in 
knowing when the legislative intent forbids a waiver.  The standard is 
whether the state affects the public interest or the institutional concerns of 
the legislature but all statues to a greater or lesser degree reflect these 
concerns.  If they did not, the legislature has no business enacting them.  
Another point of potential confusion is that if the standard is that a court may 
deem a statute to be non-waivable based on the legislative intent or an 
affirmative prohibition to this effect, relatively few statutes will self-identify 
in these categories.  As a prominent treatise points out, “[t]he line between 
statutes which may be waived and those which may not be waived is not 
clearly defined, and judicial opinions on this matter are inconsistent.”
259
 
As shown above, the imprecise standards that characterize much of the 
implied incorporation doctrine also exist on whether parties have the ability 
to waive a particular law.  When parties are unable to predict with confidence 
if the implied incorporation doctrine will impact their ability to waive a 
particular law, the doctrine undermines the established goals for stable 
contracting relationships in the commercial law system. 
IV.   MODIFICATION OR REJECTION OF THE DOCTRINE 
Not all state and federal courts embrace the traditional implied 
 
Supreme Court and Federal Circuit decisions). 
 255.  Tesoro Haw. Corp. v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 65, 73 (2003) (citing cases), rev’d 
on other grounds, 405 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 256.  41 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7109 (2011). 
 257.  See Burnside-Ott Aviation Training Ctr. v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 854, 859 (Fed. Cir. 
1997) (permitting the parties to waive the Dispute Act’s procedural protections would 
“subvert” the federal procurement system). 
 258.  See Barrentine v. Arkansas–Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 740 (1981) 
(reinforcing the Court’s ruling that FLSA rights can be neither waived nor obviated by 
contract in a way that counteracts the purpose of the statute); Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 
324 U.S. 697, 707 (1945) (finding that voluntarily waiving employee wage and hour laws 
neutralizes the purpose of the FLSA). 
 259.  2B NORMAN SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 55:8 (7th ed. 2012). 
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incorporation doctrine — the gamut runs from minor revisions to outright 
rejection.  As a further reflection of the confusion on this topic, many of these 
decisions have overlooked other cases from that same jurisdiction approving 
the conventional viewpoint.  Below is a sampling of formulations backing 
away from the standard implied incorporation doctrine: 
(1) Relevant laws can form the context or background for common law 
contract construction.
260
 
(2) Relevant laws are both part of the contract and part of the 
contemporaneous circumstances surrounding the contract.
261
 
(3) “Contracts are presumed to be drafted with reference to existing 
principles of law, and in general, intent to modify applicable law by contract 
is effective only where expressly stated.”
262
 
(4) Statutes are not implied terms when “a statute is so far afield of 
 
 260.  See Stahl v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 327 F.3d 697, 701 (8th Cir. 2003) (interpreting a 
contract “in light of” the relevant statutes and regulations); Patterson v. Dep’t of Interior, 899 
F.2d 799, 807 (9th Cir. 1990) (ruling that interpretation of government contracts is to be made 
against the backdrop of relevant legislation); Pioneer Reserve, LLC v. United States, 125 Fed. 
Cl. 112, 118 (Fed. Cl. 2016) (ruling that a statute mentioned in passing in the contract was 
merely “background” information). See also 3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 
551 at 198 (rev. ed. 1960) (arguing that the principle should be limited to laws being part of 
the surrounding circumstances).   
If he meant it in a factual sense, Corbin (and courts following him) overstate the law when 
they say that “the existing laws are always among [the surrounding] circumstances.” 5 
ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.26 at 271 (Joseph M. Perillo rev. ed. 1998).  
Many parties negotiating a contract may never reference a statute in the contract or during 
negotiations and might not even recognize a statute from the books if they saw one.  Even if 
the parties did discuss a law during pre-contract negotiations, evidence of their past probable 
intent is inadmissible.  See Deerhurst Estates, 165 A.2d at 550-51 (ruling that the parties, 
before signing the contract, were “fully aware” of a particular statute because it was a 
“repeated subject of discussion before the contract was executed,” and excluding evidence of 
how the parties thought the contract language incorporating the statute was intended to be 
construed). 
Corbin also offered a more accurate, refined statement of the “surrounding circumstances” 
view when he said that “[r]emedies and ‘obligation’ are created by the law, not the parties; 
and the interpretation involved is constitutional and statutory interpretation.”  3 ARTHUR L. 
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 551 at 200 (rev. ed. 1960).  Corbin’s view here tracks one 
of the dissenting opinions in Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 313, 325 (1827), where Justice 
Trimble argued that the law is not part of the contract but is the standard by which courts 
consider the parties’ contractual rights and obligations.  See infra note 273 and accompanying 
text. 
 261.  P.R. Dep’t of Labor and Human Res. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 24, 31 (2001). See 
also Dart Advantage Warehousing, Inc. v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 694, 702 (2002) 
(emphasizing the ultimate importance of the words and responsibilities laid out in a contract 
agreement). But see Barker v. Palmer, 8 S.E.2d 610, 612 (N.C. 1940) (noting that a difference 
exists between statutes being read into a contract versus the contract being entered into in 
contemplation of applicable law). 
 262.  Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 373 F.3d 1100, 1108 
(10th Cir. 2004). 
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matters of normal interest to contracting parties that they would not have 
thought it would affect the terms of their contract.”
263
 
(5) Statutes become an implied contractual term only when the statute 
is “self-implementing,” i.e., it contains detailed criteria for when a particular 
contract is covered by the statute
264
 and does not require the issuance of 
regulations to make it fully effective.
265
 
(6) “While contracts may incorporate particular laws as contract terms, 
it must do so with specificity; general choice of law provisions do not 
accomplish this task.”
266
 
(7) “This rule . . . should be limited to those laws which are ‘applicable’ 
and which affect ‘the validity, construction, discharge, or enforcement of the 
contract’ and care should be taken that its application is not extended to 
lengths which approach absurdity.”
267
 
(8) “[N]ot all ‘state regulations are implied terms of every contract 
entered into while they are effective, especially when the regulations 
themselves cannot be fairly interpreted to require such incorporation.’”
268
 
Some other decisions disavow or severely limit the doctrine (even as 
other cases from the same jurisdiction follow the prevailing rule).  A 
 
 263.  In re Doctors Hosp. of Hyde Park, Inc., 337 F.3d at 958-61 (citations omitted) 
(deeming “artificial” the presumption that parties contract with knowledge of the law and that 
when courts imply laws as contract terms they are “merely construing the contract in 
accordance with the intent of the parties.”). 
 264.  See Univs. Research Ass’n, Inc., v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 784 (1981) (holding that 
the Davis Bacon Act setting wage rates for federal agency construction projects does not 
support a private right of action for workers to sue employers for back wages); Niagara 
Mohawk Power Corp. v. F.E.R.C., 162 F. Supp. 2d 101, 107 (N.D.N.Y. 2001) (describing 
that when a statute is not self-implementing, it is a “regulatory statute” that takes meaning and 
authority from its attendant regulations); Success Against All Odds v. Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 
700 A.2d 1340, 1351 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997) (explaining that a statute is self-executing if it is 
“mandatory in nature and require[s] no further legislative action in order to become 
effective.”). 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 5 cmt. c (Am. Law. Inst. 1981), calls this category 
of contract terms “statutory contract terms” and proffers the U.C.C. as the most prominent 
example of statutes mandating these terms.  The Restatement here correctly notes that these 
statutory terms do not require the obligor’s manifested agreement to this type of obligation.  
 265.  In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Prods. Liab. Litig., 559 F. Supp. 2d 
424, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Cal. Forestry Ass’n v. Cal. Fish & Game Comm’n, 68 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 391, 404 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).   
 266.  Yonkers Sav. and Loan Ass’n, 396 F.3d 178, 186 (2d Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). 
 267.  Wing v. Forest Lawn Cemetery Ass’n, 101 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Cal. 1940) (citations 
omitted). But see FutureSource LLC v. Reuters Ltd., 312 F.3d 281, 284-85 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(“Nonsensical interpretations of contracts . . . are disfavored . . . because people are unlikely 
to make contracts . . . they believe will have absurd consequences.”). 
 268.  Am. Exp. Travel Related Servs., supra note 46, at 370 (quoting Romein, supra note 
46, at 189) (stating that the principle goes no further than the laws affecting the validity, 
construction, enforcement or discharge of the contract).  Query what elements of a contract 
are left uncovered by the laundry list in the prior sentence. 
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California decision forbade a private party from enforcing a rural cemetery 
association statute in private contract litigation because the State, and not 
private parties, was charged with enforcing this legislative enactment.
269
  A 
Michigan Court of Appeals case rejects the rule because it distorts the 
principle of party assent.
270
  A Connecticut Supreme Court decision said that 
the contract alone governed the parties’ rights and obligations because the 
contract did not provide for performance in conformity with the statute.
271
  
Along the same lines as this Connecticut decision, a Pennsylvania
272
 case 
held that an existing law did not bind the parties because the law was not 
affirmatively stated to be part of the contract.  The U.S. Supreme Court in 
Ogden v. Saunders was divided on whether existing law is part of a contract 
— and two of the brightest luminaries in American legal history, Chief 
Justice John Marshall and Associate Justice Joseph Story, dissented because 
they contended that statutes cannot be implied contract terms.
273
  In most of 
the above jurisdictions, however, with no attempt to reconcile the conflicting 
authority, the same courts in other opinions recognize the standard implied 
 
 269.  See Wing, supra, note 267, at 1101 (interpreting a statute regarding the incorporation 
of rural cemetery associations). But see Rice v. Downs, 203 Cal. Rptr. 3d 565, 565-66 (Cal. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (following the usual implied incorporation principle). 
 270.  See T & S Distribs., supra note 18, at *9 (stating that “Michigan courts [reject] such 
a principle, and will not read into an agreement terms that have not been placed there by the 
parties” and also that such laws are only part of the surrounding circumstances). But see 
LaFontaine Saline, Inc. v. Chrysler Grp., 852 N.W.2d 78, 84 (Mich. 2014): “‘[Statutes] are 
necessarily referred to in all contracts, and form a part of them, as the measure of obligation 
to perform them by the one party and right acquired by the other.’” 
 271.  Cronin v Pace, 73 A. 137, 138 (Conn. 1909); contra Russo v. City of Waterbury, 41 
A.3d 1043, 1047 (Conn. 2012) (“[A] contract must be interpreted in light of the laws that 
existed at the time the parties entered into the agreement.”). 
 272.  Meneice v. Camp Kadimah Co., 43 A.2d 621, 622 (Pa. Super. 1945) (reasoning that 
implied incorporation doctrine for a private contract depends on the intent of the parties); 
contra Petty v. Hosp. Serv. Ass’n of Ne. Pa., 23 A.3d 1004, 1012 (Pa. 2011) (“[T]he laws in 
place at the time of a contract’s execution are incorporated into the contract and become 
contractual obligations.”). 
 273.  In Ogden, writing for himself, Story, and another justice, Justice Marshall observed 
in a lengthy dissenting opinion,  
We have, then, no hesitation in saying that, however law may act upon contracts, 
it does not enter into them, and become a part of the agreement.  The effect of 
such a principle would be a mischievous abridgment of legislative power over 
subjects within the proper jurisdiction of States, by arresting their power to repeal 
or modify such laws with respect to existing contracts.   
Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 313, 344 (1827) (Marshall J., dissenting).  Another justice in the 
same decision objected that the obligation of contract “consists not in the contract itself, but 
in a superior external force, controlling the conduct of the parties in relation to the contract; 
and . . . [i]t is this superior external force, existing potentially, or actually applied, ‘which 
binds a man to perform his engagements’ . . . .”).  Id. at 325 (Trimble, J., dissenting) (citations 
omitted).   
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incorporation doctrine.
274
 
The jurisdiction with the most confusing lines of authority is the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and its subordinate tribunals, 
where some decisions come quite close to repudiating the implied 
incorporation doctrine, especially when the contract has open-ended 
language.  The Federal Circuit and the subordinate United States Court of 
Federal Claims have rejected the argument that a contractual term simply 
providing that a party shall abide by “applicable regulations” — which 
obligation differs little from the implied incorporation doctrine — would fail 
to bind a party to every regulation conceivably relevant to the contract.
275
  
Another Federal Circuit case says that it will be insufficient in this respect 
for a contract to say that the agreement “is subject to the present regulations 
of the [agency] and to its future regulations not inconsistent with the express 
provisions hereof.”
276
  The Federal Circuit has emphasized that construing a 
contract as written in this fashion would create an unfair scenario by which 
the plaintiff could pick and choose among an undue number of regulations, 
thereby creating extensive exposure to risk and liability “summarily created 
by mere implication.”
277
 
The Federal Circuit’s concern is that mere passing references to the 
statute or regulation as a whole are insufficient to achieve “wholesale 
 
 274.  See supra notes 269-72 and cases cited therein. 
 275.  Nat’l Leased Hous., supra note 39, at 766 (stating that the term “applicable 
regulations” injects “considerable indefiniteness” about the parties’ respective obligations 
under the contract which could open a “Pandora’s Box . . . .”). 
 276.  See Smithson v. United States, 847 F.2d 791, 794 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (doubting it was 
the agency’s intent to make a “wholesale incorporation of a mass of regulations many of 
which would probably have nothing to do with the FmHA’s [Farmers Home Administration] 
transactions with the [plaintiff] . . . .”). See also Northrop Grumman Info. Tech., Inc. v. U.S., 
535 F.3d 1339, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (stating that the Federal Circuit “has been reluctant to 
find that statutory or regulatory provisions are incorporated into a contract with the 
government unless the contract explicitly provides for their incorporation.”) (emphasis in 
original) (quoting St. Christopher Assocs. v. United States, 511 F.3d 1376, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 
2001)); Franconia Assocs. v. United States, 61 Fed. Cl. 718, 732 n.19 (Fed. Cl. 2004) (“‘To 
read [a] contract . . . as incorporating all future [statutes and regulations] . . . would raise 
serious questions about illusory contracts, and perhaps questions of due process and other 
constitutional concerns.’”) (quoting Marathon Oil Co. v. United States, 177 F.3d 1331, 1337 
(Fed. Cir 1998)); Lurline Gardens Ltd. Hous. P’ship v. United States, 37 Fed. Cl. 415, 421 
n.7 (Fed. Cl. 1997) (“A recital that an agreement is governed or executed pursuant to a set of 
regulations does not incorporate those regulations into the agreement.”); Valley Cleaners, 
ASBCA No. 10253, 65-1 BCA ¶ 4,720 (Armed. Serv. B.C.A 1965) (noting the insuperable 
task for any government contracting official or government contractor to understand ex ante 
the class of applicable regulations regarding a particular contract). 
 277.  Smithson, supra note 276, at 795 (“This agreement is subject to the present 
regulations of the secured party [FmHA] and to its future regulations not inconsistent with the 
express provisions hereof.”). 
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incorporation” of the statute or regulation.
278
  This argument is based on the 
common law concept that when parties wish to incorporate extrinsic 
information in the contract, the contract must use  “clear and express 
language of incorporation” evidencing the parties’ desires to make the 
information more than just merely relevant to the agreement.
279
  In fact, 
precedent from the Federal Circuit’s predecessor court, the United States 
Court of Claims, could be more restrictive than current law because the Court 
of Claims rejected contractual liability based on terms implied at law.  This 
earlier precedent, which is still good law in the Federal Circuit, recognizes 
that absent express incorporation of regulations in the contract, a plaintiff 
suing for breach “cannot . . . import into the agreement terms outside of those 
expressly contained in the agreement.”
280
 
Other cases from the Federal Circuit follow a diametrically opposed, 
more liberal, plaintiff-friendly doctrine. In one case, the Federal Circuit has 
stated without qualification, “The [Federal Acquisition Regulation’s (FAR) 
predecessor] is law which governs the award and interpretation of contracts 
as fully as if it were made a part thereof.”
281
  In a divergent approach to when 
regulations physically absent from the contract may confer a remedy, the 
Court of Federal Claims also has said that it will read a regulation into a 
contract, and thereby acquire jurisdiction under the Contract Disputes Act, 
in light of the regulation’s (1) purpose, (2) connection to a Government 
contract and (3) intended beneficiaries.
282
 
Notwithstanding the decisions disclaiming incorporation based on mere 
general references to statutes or regulations,
283
 another Court of Federal 
Claims decision allows a general reference to regulations as a predicate for 
 
 278.  Precision Pine & Timber, Inc. v. United States, 596 F.3d 817, 826 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 
Northrop Grumman Info. Tech., Inc., supra note 276, at 1344-45. See also Earman v. United 
States, 114 Fed. Cl. 81, 103-04 (2013), aff’d, 589 Fed. Appx. 991 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (concluding 
that the parties did not adequately incorporate the statute in question by reference, as they did 
not explicitly identify the written material being incorporated; nor did the parties clearly 
communicate that the reason why they made the reference to the statute was to incorporate it 
into the contract). 
 279.  St. Christopher Assocs., supra note 276, at 1384 (“This court has been reluctant to 
find that statutory or regulatory provisions are incorporated into a contract with the 
government unless the contract explicitly provides for their incorporation.”) (citations 
omitted). 
 280.  See Tex. v. United States, 537 F.2d 466, 471 (Ct. Cl. 1976). See also Earman, supra 
note 278, at 103 (construed in Tex. v. United States and noting that a statement that a contract 
shall be “‘carried out in accordance with all applicable Federal statutes and regulations’” does 
not incorporate wholesale sections of federal statutory and regulatory law).  
 281.  Beta Sys., Inc. v. United States, 838 F.2d 1179, 1185 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (quoting Chris 
Berg, Inc. v. United States, 426 F.2d 313, 314 (Ct. Cl. 1970)). 
 282.  Todd Constr. v. United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 100, 106-113 (2010). See 52 Gov’t 
Contractor  288 (Aug. 25, 2010) for further analysis. 
 283.  See supra notes 276-79 and accompanying text. 
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relief.
284
  In a third divergence, several Court of Federal Claims cases say 
that relevant laws are both part of the contract and part of the 
contemporaneous circumstances surrounding the contract.
285
  A fourth case 
approves a standard FAR contract clause requiring the private party’s 
compliance with “all applicable Federal, State, and local laws, executive 
orders, rules and regulations applicable to its performance under the 
contract.”
286
  The Federal Circuit has not reconciled the above lines of 
authority with other binding decisions in that same jurisdiction accepting the 
standard implied incorporation doctrine.
287
 
Lastly, the Federal Circuit follows yet another variation on this theme 
in federal government contracts cases.  The Christian doctrine, named after 
a 1963 U.S. Court of Claims decision (the Federal Circuit’s predecessor), 
holds that “a mandatory contract clause [so designated either by statute or 
regulation] that expresses a significant or deeply ingrained strand of public 
procurement policy is considered to be included in a [federal executive 
branch government] contract by operation of law,” irrespective of its 
physical presence in the agreement
288
 or whether procurement officials have 
 
 284.  Mann v. United States, 53 Fed. Cl. 562, 565 (2002) (upholding a contract 
incorporating “‘all terms, conditions, and requirements of . . . all regulations promulgated by 
the Secretary of the Interior including, but not limited to, 43 C.F.R. Parts 3000 and 
3200 . . . .’”), rev’d on other grounds, 334 F.3d 1048 (Fed. Cir. 2003).  Notably, the Federal 
Circuit here expressly agreed with the Court of Federal Claims that the plaintiff had sufficient 
constructive notification of the regulatory statute at issue.  Mann, 334 F.3d at 1050-51. 
 285.  P.R. Dep’t of Labor and Human Res. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 24, 31 (2001). See 
also Dart Advantage Warehousing, Inc. v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 694, 702 (2002).  
 286.  Nilson Van & Storage v. United States, 99 Fed. Cl. 408, 410 (2011) (citing 48 C.F.R. 
§ 52.212-4(q)). 
 287.  Compare E. Bldg. Corp. v. United States, 96 Ct. Cl. 399, 406 (1942) (“‘Laws which 
subsist at the time and place of the making of a contract enter into and form a part of it, as 
fully as if they had been explicitly referred to or incorporated in its terms.’”), with Gen. Eng’g 
& Mach. Works v. O’Keefe, 991 F.2d 775, 779 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“[T]he Christian doctrine 
does not permit the automatic incorporation of every required contract clause.”). 
 288.  S.J. Amoroso Const. Co., Inc. v. United States, 12 F.3d 1072, 1075 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
See also O’Keefe, 991 F.2d at 779 (analyzing G.L. Christian & Assocs. v. United States, 312 
F.2d 418 (Ct. Cl. 1963)); but see Brian A. Darst, The Christian Doctrine at 50: Unraveling 
the Federal Procurement System’s Gordian Knot, 13-11 Government Contractor Briefing 
Papers 1 (Oct. 2013) (noting that “the Christian doctrine is not tied to the intent of the parties” 
and that the “Christian doctrine . . . carries with it a great deal of unpredictability, even where 
a clause or provision may be mandated by statute or regulation.”). 
An example of such a clause that the Government relying on Christian may invoke is the 
standard termination for convenience clause which allows the government in its interests to 
conclude the contractor’s performance short of contract completion.  See e.g., Todd Constr., 
supra note 282, at 108 (2010).  A contractor may invoke the Christian doctrine, however, 
only where the missing clause was written to benefit the private contractor or both the 
government and the contractor.  Id. at 108-12 (stating also that a contractor’s status as 
incidental beneficiary of the statute is insufficient). 
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inadvertently or intentionally substituted one clause for another.
289
 
Given the divergent lines of authority, the Federal Circuit’s precedents 
need substantial reconciliation.  For one, a respected commentator says that 
the Federal Circuit’s recent reliance on incorporation by reference as the 
justification for the implied incorporation doctrine is inconsistent with, and 
inferior to, the Christian line of decisions.
290
  Another line of discrepant case 
law is that, as shown above, the Federal Circuit in one line of decisions has 
said that express incorporation of laws is necessary for a particular law to be 
controlling but another line of authority provides that a catch-all reference in 
a contract incorporates all relevant laws.
291
 
V.   THE IMPLIED INCORPORATION DOCTRINE: A 
SUGGESTED REFORM 
A state may freely alter, amend, or abolish common law doctrines, 
either by legislative
292
 or judicial
293
 action.  This Article advocates that courts 
perform a significant overhaul of the implied incorporation doctrine.  
Presently, most cases burden contracts with unstated and even unknowable 
terms, where parties must guess ex ante about the content of their bargain, 
without an exchange of consideration to support the extra duties or 
responsibilities.
294
  This Article offers the following scaled-back version of 
the current implied incorporation doctrine: 
A law can form the basis for an implied contract right or a contract 
defense only where: (1) the law in question is for either the joint benefit of 
the parties or exists for the sole benefit of the moving party, and (2) the 
 
 289.  S.J. Amoroso Const. Co., supra note 288, at 1075. 
 290.  Ralph C. Nash, Postscript: Incorporation by Reference, 28 Nash & Cibinic Rep. 19 
(Apr. 2014) (analyzing Earman, supra note 271, and noting that Christian “is . . . the correct 
way to analyze the issue” and also criticizing the incorporation by reference theory because a 
contractor “will have to review all of the statutes and regulations addressing how a program 
is to be carried out and insist that the agency put explicit language in its contract incorporating 
the appropriate statues and regulations into the contract.”). 
 291.  See supra note 275 and accompanying text. 
 292.  Sciranko v. Fid. & Guar. Life Ins. Co., 503 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1316 (D. Ariz. 2007) 
(citation omitted) (“It is well established that a State may, by legislative enactment, ‘freely 
alter, amend or abolish the common law within its jurisdiction.’”).  
 293.  15A AM. JUR. 2D Common Law § 13 (2009) (“Total abrogation, revision, or 
modification or change of an outmoded common-law rule is within the competence of the 
judiciary . . . .”). 
 294.  Compare Koby v. United States, 47 Fed. Cl. 99, 103 (2000) (citations omitted) 
(noting that courts “‘will not disturb the agreement into which the parties freely entered and 
for which consideration was given[,]’” because courts may not “‘redistribute the risks’” under 
a contract), with United Air Lines, Inc. v. ALG, Inc., 916 F. Supp. 793, 795-96 (N.D. Ill. 
1996) (citations omitted) (noting that a court’s role is to enforce the allocation of “risks and 
opportunities” that the parties have chosen for their contract). 
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contract expressly incorporates the particular laws (or parts of laws) as 
term(s) of the agreement or (3) the law maker’s intent for the law (inclusive 
of laws stemming from the state’s police power) requires that a contract 
contain the law as conveying both a contractual right and remedy.  A party 
may waive the protection of a law unless the lawmaker precludes waiver of 
such a right. 
The first question must be the grievant’s standing to bring the action 
because standing is jurisdictional and a complaining party’s failure to 
establish standing would preclude a decision on the merits.
295
  No basis exists 
for a party to complain about the enforceability of an implied statute or 
regulation intended solely for the benefit of the other party.  The proposal 
also fully credits the waiver doctrine (including the exception). 
The proposed reform is also rooted in the true rationale for the doctrine. 
This Article jettisons the prevailing doctrinal justifications that parties know 
and intend to follow the law or that the parties’ hypothetical bargain dictates 
the incorporation of relevant or applicable laws and regulations.  The 
proposal gets back to basics by giving a statutory/regulatory solution to a 
statutory/regulatory problem. 
The proposal narrows the categories of cognizable “laws” to statutes, 
regulations, and the like (inclusive of codes and ordinances) to those 
enactments with the force and effect of law.  Current law is far too liberal by 
including laws that are merely “relevant” or “applicable” to the contract.  
This Article also disagrees that the doctrine exists to prevent parties by 
private contract from overriding legislative enactments.  Instead, absent the 
parties’ express inclusion in the contract of particular laws and regulations 
as support for a right and remedy, the germane inquiry is whether the 
legislature (or other originating authority) has conferred upon the aggrieved 
party a private contractual right of action and remedy for the other side’s 
breach of the particular law or other policy.  Duly enacted laws and 
regulations govern the conduct of persons by their own force and no need 
exists to imply them as a contract term except in accordance with enacting 
body’s intent. 
This proposal avoids the pitfalls plaguing the current doctrine.  It 
preserves the distinction between statutes being the acts of the legislature and 
contracts being the acts of the parties.  The current doctrine, as opposed to 
the proposal, has resorted to the dubious use of legal fictions for much of the 
rationale for the implied incorporation doctrine.  By banking on the 
legislative intent, the proposal avoids the debate regarding whether the 
doctrine is an immutable rule or a default principle.  This proposal further 
 
 295.  See generally Media Techs. Licensing, LLC v. Upper Deck Co., 334 F.3d 1366, 1370 
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (discussing standing). 
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tracks with the essential role of courts in disputes about this aspect of 
contract construction – to effectuate the expectations of the legislature but 
not the particular commercial expectations of the individual parties.  
Accordingly, this proposal has strong support from the principles of 
construction because it recognizes that a party can have no reasonable or 
settled expectation that a law grants a contract right or remedy absent 
language clearly permitting this benefit. 
Lastly, the doctrine eliminates the unfair aspects of the doctrine where 
a party fails to incorporate a clause, the other party relies on that omission, 
and a court unforeseeably raises the statute as a defense to liability.  In Part 
II.A, this Article cited an Indiana case dealing with the implied requirement 
for restitution in a criminal plea agreement.  It was sufficiently clear that the 
plea agreement had no provision for restitution and the defendant was 
entitled to rely on the case law rule that unless included in the agreement, the 
defendant had no restitutionary obligation.  Nonetheless, the court unjustly 
held the statute overrode the contrary case law. 
In sum, the proposed solution eliminates the problems associated with 
implied rules of law serving as traps for the unwary.  Instead, the proposal 
contains the clear rule that the statute must direct the inclusion of a particular 
term, thereby giving parties fair notice of the role of legislative intent for 
inclusion of statutory terms. 
What are some possible objections to the suggestion that courts fully 
exercise their common law authority in revising the doctrine?  The first 
objection might be that courts are “‘particularly loath to indulge in the abrupt 
abandonment of settled principles and distinctions that have been carefully 
developed over the years.’”
296
  The response would be courts may “abandon 
[an] outmoded and unjust common law doctrine[.]”
297
  In the words of the 
Indiana Supreme Court, “[j]udicial devotion to the doctrine of stare decisis 
is indeed a justifiable concept to be followed by our courts.  However, it 
cannot and must not be so strictly pursued to the point where our view is 
opaqued and reality disregarded.”
298
  A second objection might be that 
current law is based on the simpler test of “relevancy” or “applicability” of 
the statute whereas the proposed test could plunge courts into the 
complexities of statutory construction.  The response would be that this 
Article has shown that courts have been engulfed with numerous doctrinal 
deficiencies, gaps, and contradictions and that the “relevancy” standard is a 
 
 296.  State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d 428, 446 (R.I. 2008). See also Anson v. 
Schroeder, 671 A.2d 1023, 1027 (N.H. 1995) (stating that changes should be made 
“sparingly” and “deliberately”); Falcone v. Middlesex Cty. Med. Soc., 170 A.2d 791, 796 
(N.J. 1961) (arguing that changes should be “gradual”). 
 297.  McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52, 56 (Tenn. 1992).  
 298.  Brooks v. Robinson, 284 N.E.2d 794, 797 (Ind. 1972). 
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major contributor to the confusion.  My proposal avoids all these 
deficiencies. 
CONCLUSION 
Although nearly 1,200 state and federal decisions have considered the 
implied incorporation doctrine, which has been extant at least since 1806, 
this Article is the first to perform a comprehensive doctrinal, theoretical and 
policy discussion of this “basic legal concept of longstanding and accepted 
use.”
299
 
After reviewing the numerous strands to the doctrine, and the divergent 
approaches and unresolved issues, and suggesting new answers to all these 
thorny problems, my assessment is that an unsuccessful melding of statutory 
and contractual construction in deducing contract terms is the main reason 
for the current flawed state of the law. 
My proposal retains the doctrine as a useful tool for the efficient 
operation of applicable agreements only where the parties expressly agree to 
the particular term or where the enacting body intended that a provision 
should be part of the bargain.  This streamlined version of the common law 
doctrine comports with the courts’ current outlook in general about distilling 
private rights from public statutes.  Therefore, it should attract the interest of 
courts and legislatures willing to examine this maxim of construction in a 
manner consistent with long-held legal policies. 
 
 
 299.  See supra at note 8 and accompanying text. 
